# Indigenous Data Governance (IDG) control catalogue v0.1

<!-- Generated by `pnpm idg:build` from docs/idg. Do not edit by hand. -->

> **Provisional.** Controls marked provisional are operator-drafted. No community governance group has directed, reviewed or endorsed them. This catalogue is not an Indigenous data sovereignty framework or product, and must not be presented as one.

| Domain | Name | Controls |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GOV | Governance and authority | 5 |
| PPL | People | 12 |
| PRC | Process | 16 |
| TEC | Technology | 17 |
| ASR | Assurance | 5 |
| CON | Consuming entity | 13 |

## GOV: Governance and authority

### IDG-GOV-001 Community authority over Indigenous data

Status: provisional. Version 5. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

Applies to all data about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, communities, Country and knowledge, whatever its classification level.

**Control.** The organisation recognises that the community the data is about holds authority over it, acting through the people that community nominates. Decisions to collect, use, share, keep or destroy the data are made or approved by that authority, not by the organisation alone.

**Why.** Indigenous peoples have rights and interests in data about them, their Country and their knowledge. Without a named authority, the organisation that holds the data ends up deciding for the community by default.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation keeps a register of which communities its Indigenous data relates to and who each community has nominated to decide about it. |
| IDG-ML2 | Every decision to collect, use, share or destroy Indigenous data has a recorded approval from the community's nominated people before it takes effect. |
| IDG-ML3 | Systems refuse an action that has no current community approval, and the community can review every decision made under its authority. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, meeting_record, agreement, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: A record under a cultural protocol names its custodian groups. Only a person with an approved membership of one of those groups can open it. Membership is a relationship to the group, not a system role.; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/core/src/governance/authority-membership.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: When a custodian group has no active approved member, two owners or admins can bootstrap its first members citing a record of the group decision (never an owner or admin), and those memberships stay provisional pending community confirmation (issue #286). Once a group has an active member, only its approved members decide membership. Decisions to collect, use, share or destroy data are not all recorded as community approvals; that evidence is manual outside data sharing agreement sign-offs.
- Crosswalks: TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) user-focus: partial. TRUST asks repositories to meet the norms of their user communities, which can include the people the data is about. It does not give anyone authority over the data. IDG gives that authority to the community the data is about.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1: partial. The Framework asks agencies to partner with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at every stage of the data lifecycle. IDG-GOV-001 goes further on authority: the community the data is about decides, rather than sharing the decision with the organisation. The governance committees and paying partners in actions G1.2 to G1.4 are mapped to IDG-GOV-005, not to this control.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.4: supports. Noting where people can take part is narrower than IDG-GOV-001, which needs the community's approval at each of those points.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0: no equivalent. Security frameworks give authority to the organisation that holds the data. None gives it to the community the data is about.; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. Security frameworks give authority to the organisation that holds the data. None gives it to the community the data is about.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme: no equivalent. The Australian Privacy Principles protect individuals. They do not recognise collective authority over data.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship: no equivalent. FAIR is about making data reusable. It does not say who holds authority over the data. CARE was written to fill that gap.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data: no equivalent. ISO/IEC 38505-1 makes the organisation's governing body accountable for the organisation's use of data. None of the paraphrased entries (see crosswalk-gaps.md) gives authority to the community the data is about. IDG puts that community above the governing body for decisions about its data, and gives the governing body no cultural authority.
- Related: IDG-GOV-002, IDG-GOV-003, IDG-GOV-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).
- v4 (2026-11-03): The Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data G1 note points to IDG-GOV-005 for governance committees and paying partners.
- v5 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-GOV-002 Operator roles cannot override community authority

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

Applies to any data under a cultural protocol, and to the emergency access process for all data at these levels.

**Control.** No system role, administrator account or emergency access procedure gives anyone access to data a community has placed under cultural protocol. Emergency access may exist for other data, but every use is logged and reviewed, and it never extends to protocol-bound material.

**Why.** If the people who run a system can read anything in it, authority over community knowledge sits with the operator. Keeping system administration and cultural authority apart is what makes community authority real.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Policy states that no operator role or emergency access process grants access to protocol-bound data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access controls enforce the policy, and each use of emergency access on other data is logged and reviewed after the event. |
| IDG-ML3 | The refusal is tested automatically on every system change, and the community can see every attempt to use an operator role or emergency access against its data. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: policy, configuration, system_check, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: The custodian check runs before clearance. The tenant owner role does not satisfy it, and a break-glass claim is refused for protocol-bound material. Break-glass use on other material is recorded at high severity.; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; docs/indigenous-data-sovereignty.md; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; Gaps: Once a custodian group has an active approved member, only its members decide membership and owners or admins cannot add themselves. An empty group is bootstrapped by two different owners or admins citing the same group decision (never making an owner or admin a member), so initial group setup remains operator-mediated until issue #286 is resolved. The database owner connection is not subject to application-level access checks.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3(10): exceeds. AC-3(10) audits an override of access control. IDG allows no override for protocol-bound data.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1611: exceeds. Break glass is allowed when normal authentication cannot be used. IDG never allows it for protocol-bound data.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1613: partial. Logging of break glass use. IDG also requires review after each use.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-5: supports; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-05: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1508: exceeds. The ISM limits privileged access to what a person's duties need. IDG bars every operator role from protocol-bound material, whatever its duties.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1610: partial. Documents and tests emergency access. IDG also bars it from protocol-bound material and reviews every use.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data: no equivalent. ISO/IEC 38505-1 has the governing body direct the organisation's use of data. IDG-GOV-002 sets a limit none of the paraphrased entries sets: whatever the governing body directs, no system role or emergency access reaches material a community has placed under cultural protocol.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).
- v3 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-GOV-003 Right to decline and to withdraw

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** A community may decline to take part in any data activity and may withdraw its agreement later. When it withdraws, the organisation stops the activity, records the decision and carries out the return or destruction terms agreed with the community.

**Why.** Communities keep the right not to take part in data processes that do not meet their expectations. A right to withdraw that cannot be acted on is not a right.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Agreements state the right to decline and to withdraw, and the community has been told how to use it. |
| IDG-ML2 | A withdrawal stops new use within an agreed time, and the organisation records what was stopped, returned or destroyed. |
| IDG-ML3 | Systems stop use as soon as a withdrawal is recorded, and the return or destruction terms cover derived data and copies held by others. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: agreement, procedure, audit_log, attestation
- BlakSmith evidence: Consent on a record can be revoked, and revocation is recorded as an event. Agreements record whether data is returned, destroyed or kept under protocol at the end.; packages/graph/src/consent-lifecycle.ts; packages/core/src/governance/agreement.ts; Gaps: No automated test covers consent revocation. The return or destroy term is recorded but not carried out by the product, and copies held by others are out of its reach.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-4(3): partial. Covers an individual revoking consent, not a community withdrawing collectively.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-GOV-004 Governing body oversight below community authority

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

The governing body is the organisation's board, owners, partners or executive managers, whichever governs the organisation.

**Control.** The organisation's governing body evaluates, directs and monitors how the organisation handles Indigenous data, and is accountable for it. It does this within the decisions of the communities the data is about. It cannot approve a use a community has not approved, and it holds no cultural authority over material a community has placed under protocol.

**Why.** Someone at the top of the organisation must answer for how it handles Indigenous data. If that oversight is not placed below community authority, the governing body ends up deciding for communities by default.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The governing body has assigned oversight of Indigenous data to itself or one of its committees, and receives a report on it at least once a year. |
| IDG-ML2 | The governing body sets its direction for Indigenous data in writing and receives regular reports on agreements, incidents, access reviews and community decisions. Its records show it has not approved anything a community has not. |
| IDG-ML3 | The governing body gets independent assurance, such as an audit, on how Indigenous data is handled, and tells the communities concerned what it found and did. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: policy, meeting_record, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) edm-model: partial. ISO/IEC 38505-1 gives the governing body the tasks of evaluating, directing and monitoring the use of data. IDG adds that it does so within the communities' decisions and holds no cultural authority.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) governing-body-accountability: supports; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-mechanisms: supports; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-assurance: supports. Covers independent assurance at ML3. IDG also tells the communities concerned what it found.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data: no equivalent. The Framework's monitoring and accountability section mentions senior executive oversight, but it has no numbered actions, so there is no entry to map to. G1.3 covers the mechanisms for implementing the Framework, with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander representation, and is mapped to IDG-GOV-005, not the governing body's own oversight. IDG-GOV-004 also places that oversight below the communities' decisions.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001, IDG-GOV-002, IDG-GOV-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-GOV-005 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in data governance

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people take part, with authority to influence the outcome, in the organisation's committees and other bodies that make or advise on decisions about Indigenous data. Where possible they are connected to the communities the data is about. The organisation names a person to lead its governance of Indigenous data, preferably an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person, and pays people from outside the organisation for their time and expertise.

**Why.** Decisions about Indigenous data made without Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people repeat the exclusion that much of the data reflects. Taking part in the organisation's bodies is not the same as a community's authority over its own data: this control adds to IDG-GOV-001 and does not replace it, and no member speaks for a community unless that community says so.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation names a lead for its governance of Indigenous data and records which of its bodies make or advise on decisions about that data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Those bodies include Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander members whose views are recorded. Members from outside the organisation are paid for their time. |
| IDG-ML3 | Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander members can put matters on the agenda and refer a decision to the community concerned, and the arrangement is reviewed with them. |

- CARE: E2: For justice; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, meeting_record, policy
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1.2: partial. The Framework asks each agency to set up governance mechanisms with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander partners to oversee its actions. IDG asks for their part in every body that decides or advises about Indigenous data.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1.3: partial. Items a and b of G1.3 cover part of this control: representation from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander stakeholders as connected as possible to affected communities, with appropriate authority to influence agency actions. IDG adds their part in every body that decides or advises about Indigenous data, a named lead and paying people from outside the organisation. Items c to e, such as spanning all the organisation's data holdings and its senior executives, are not part of this control.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.1(a): partial. The Framework's Indigenous data champion, who would preferably be an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander staff member at executive level, covers part of this control. IDG adds Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in governance bodies and paying people from outside the organisation. IDG prefers that its named lead be an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person, but does not require executive level, the appropriate authority and support to influence the work of the agency that G4.1(a) asks for, or making upskilling and recruiting for the role a priority.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1.4: supports. Covers paying partners for their time and expertise.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001, IDG-GOV-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.

## PPL: People

### IDG-PPL-001 Defined roles and separation of duties

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation names the roles that handle Indigenous data and writes down what each may do: data steward at the receiving organisation, key custodian, platform operator and auditor. For community data custodians and delegates, it records the duties the community sets for them. No one person holds roles whose duties should check each other for the same data, such as operating the platform and recording custodian appointments, or holding keys and auditing their use.

**Why.** When one person can grant access, use it and review it, mistakes and misuse go unseen. Naming the roles also makes clear that running a system is a different job from holding authority over the data in it.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The roles are written down, each with its duties, and the people in each role are known. |
| IDG-ML2 | Conflicting roles are kept apart, and any exception is approved, recorded and reviewed. |
| IDG-ML3 | Systems enforce the separation, and the community can see who holds each role for its data. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: policy, register, configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: System roles (owner, admin, editor, agent, viewer) are separate from custodian authority. Custodian-bound material needs membership of a named custodian group, and no system role substitutes for it. Classification and consent changes are limited to human owners and admins. A custodian group's members decide its membership; a tenant role neither grants nor removes that, so owners and admins who are not members cannot. Platform-wide tenant lifecycle actions need a person listed as a platform administrator by the deployment, which no tenant role grants.; packages/authz/src/authz.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; packages/authz/src/authz.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; Gaps: There are no auditor, key custodian, delegate or data steward roles in the application. The same tenant owner or admin can manage classification and administer the tenant, so separating those duties is a matter of policy, not enforcement. Two operators together can record a group's first members, pending issue #286.
- Crosswalks: NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.RR-02: partial. Roles are set by the organisation. IDG adds duties set by the community for custodians and delegates.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-05: partial. Separation of duties within access permissions only.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-5: partial. Separation of duties within systems. IDG also separates operating the platform from recording custodian appointments.
- Related: IDG-PPL-002, IDG-PPL-005, IDG-PPL-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-002 Custodian appointments and revocations come from the community

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The community decides who may act as a custodian or delegate for its data, what each may do, and when that ends. Custodian authority is never inferred from a job title, a system role, an employment relationship or seniority in the organisation. The organisation records each appointment and revocation as the community makes it, and acts on a revocation the same day.

**Why.** Authority to make decisions about Indigenous data belongs to the community. If an organisation decides who counts as a custodian, it has taken that authority for itself.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Each appointment and revocation in the register kept under IDG-GOV-001 is traceable to an instruction from the community. |
| IDG-ML2 | Appointments and revocations take effect only on a recorded instruction from the community, and revocations take effect the same day. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community, through people it chooses, makes appointments and revocations directly in the system, and the organisation cannot change them on its own. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, meeting_record, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Custodian authority is a MEMBER_OF relationship to a traditional owner group or prescribed body corporate. Only an active, approved membership grants custody. Each change is versioned and written to the hash-chained audit log, and a person cannot approve their own membership. Once a group has an approved member who can act (signed in and still a member of the tenant), only its approved members approve, reject or remove members, whatever their tenant role; a tenant owner or admin who is not a member cannot, and every decision needs a fresh step-up. A group with nobody able to act is set up, or set up again, by two different owners or admins citing the same record of the group decision, one person at a time and never an owner or admin; those memberships are marked provisional and listed in the group's reports. Deleting the relationship, the person or the group, or merging them, cannot take an approved membership away. SCIM group names and patches that try to map custodian authority are rejected, so it cannot come from an identity provider group.; packages/core/src/governance/authority-membership.ts; packages/authz/src/membership.ts; packages/graph/src/service.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-groups.ts; packages/authz/src/membership.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph membership-verify; packages/auth/src/scim-groups.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; Gaps: The first members of a group are recorded by two operators citing the group's decision, not by the community in the system; how the community confirms them is open (issue #286), so they stay provisional. There is no distinction between a custodian and a delegate, membership has no expiry or review date, and removing a user through SCIM does not remove their custodian memberships, though it stops them counting as a member who can decide.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-2: supports. AC-2 has the organisation approve accounts. IDG requires the community to make custodian appointments.; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. Security frameworks give authority to the organisation that holds the data. None gives it to the community the data is about.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001, IDG-PPL-001, IDG-PPL-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-003 Cultural competency and data sovereignty training before access

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

The 12 month refresh is an operator suggestion. A community may set a different interval or its own content.

**Control.** The organisation's staff and contractors who will handle Indigenous data complete training in cultural competency and Indigenous data sovereignty before they are given access, and refresh it at least every 12 months or sooner if the community asks. Training covers the community's expectations, the agreements that apply, and what to do if something goes wrong. What a community expects of its own custodians and delegates is for the community to decide.

**Why.** People cannot respect protocols they do not know about. Much of the harm communities experience from data comes from people who did not understand what they were holding.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Training exists, and people complete it before they get access to Indigenous data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Completion and refresh dates are recorded, and access is removed when training lapses. |
| IDG-ML3 | Training is designed or delivered with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, is specific to the communities whose data is held, and lapsed training blocks access automatically. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: training_record, register, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0252: partial. Cyber security awareness only, not cultural competency.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 24: partial. Security awareness only, not cultural competency.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AT-01: partial. Cyber security awareness only, not cultural competency or data sovereignty.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AT-2: partial. Security and privacy literacy only, not cultural competency.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AT-3: supports; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G2.1(b): partial. The Framework's cultural competence training covers part of this control. IDG adds training before access, a refresh at least every 12 months and the agreements that apply. The Framework also asks that the training be by an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander-owned and appropriate training organisation, which IDG-PPL-003 does not require.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G2.3: supports. The Framework asks for Indigenous data concepts, including BADDR data, to be built into staff data training. IDG-PPL-003 covers Indigenous data sovereignty but does not name those concepts.
- Related: IDG-PPL-007

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PPL-004 Vetting and suitability

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

Checks should be proportionate, with the most thorough checks at the higher levels.

**Control.** The organisation's staff and contractors who handle sensitive Indigenous data pass its existing pre-employment and ongoing suitability checks, at a level that matches the sensitivity of the data. A community may ask for further requirements for its own data, and the organisation meets them or does not give that person access. Suitability of a community's own custodians and delegates is for the community to decide.

**Why.** Organisations already run personnel security for sensitive information. Indigenous data deserves at least the same care, without building a separate process that duplicates it.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation's existing personnel checks are applied to everyone with access to Indigenous data at these levels. |
| IDG-ML2 | Checks are repeated on a set cycle, and any community requirements are recorded and met before access is given. |
| IDG-ML3 | Access is tied to current suitability, so it is suspended automatically when a check lapses or is failed. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: policy, register, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0434: partial. Screening before access only. IDG adds ongoing checks and requirements set by the community.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 116: partial. IDG adds requirements set by the community for its own data.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 164: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-3: partial. IDG adds requirements set by the community for its own data.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.RR-04: supports
- Related: IDG-PPL-007

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-005 Key custodians

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Only named key custodians can carry out actions on encryption keys that protect Indigenous data, such as disabling, rotating or destroying a key. Key custodians use multi-factor authentication, are separate from day-to-day platform operators, record a reference and reason for each action, and act on a destruction or withdrawal request from the community within the time agreed with the community.

**Why.** Whoever controls the keys controls whether data can be read or destroyed. Those actions must be deliberate, attributable and responsive to the community.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Key custodians are named, and key actions are limited to them by policy. |
| IDG-ML2 | Key actions need multi-factor authentication and a recorded reference and reason, and every action is logged. |
| IDG-ML3 | Key actions are enforced by the key service itself, each one is written to a tamper-evident record the community can see, and the community can hold its own key. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: register, configuration, audit_log, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: The AWS Terraform defines a key custodian role that can only be assumed with multi-factor authentication. The application data key's policy denies disabling and scheduling deletion of that key to roles outside the key custodian name prefix. The custodian key erasure script requires a reference, a justification and typed confirmation of the group being erased. A unit test shows that erasing one custodian group's key, with the local provider, makes only that group's data unreadable. Communities can hold their own key under the documented community-held key option.; infra/aws/terraform/kms.tf; infra/aws/scripts/erase-custodian-key.sh; docs/key-custody.md; packages/crypto/src/crypto.test.ts; Gaps: The deny applies only to the application data key, not to the database, storage, log or per-group keys. Any role whose name starts with the key custodian prefix is exempt, whether or not it needs multi-factor authentication, and the account root can rewrite the key policy. The custodian role can schedule deletion of the application key, which protects every tenant, but its policy does not cover the per-group keys the erasure script targets. There is no key custodian role or erasure path in the application. The script checks the caller with a substring match and prints its record without writing it to the audit log. Nothing tests the Terraform or the script, and no live erasure or cross-account drill has been run.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-12: partial. Key management in general. IDG adds named custodians, separation from operators and acting on community requests.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SA-9(6): supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0507: partial. Key management procedures. IDG adds named custodians and acting on community requests.
- Related: IDG-PPL-001, IDG-PPL-006

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-006 Strong authentication for privileged and custodian roles

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Anyone with administrative, custodian or key custody duties signs in with phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication. Actions that change who can see Indigenous data, or how it is classified, need a fresh authentication at the time.

**Why.** Stolen and guessed passwords are a common way into systems, and privileged accounts are where a stolen password does the most harm.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Multi-factor authentication is required for administrative and custodian accounts. |
| IDG-ML2 | Sensitive actions need authentication within the last few minutes, and API keys cannot perform them. |
| IDG-ML3 | Phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys are required, and remembered devices cannot skip them. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: Users can enrol TOTP and passkeys, with user verification required for passkeys. When BLAKSMITH_REQUIRE_MFA is enabled (the default in production), owners, admins and platform admins are held at two-factor enrolment before accessing protected surfaces. Classification, consent, sharing-term and all custodian membership decisions (approve, reject and remove) need a fresh step-up from TOTP or a passkey in the same session within the last five minutes, and API keys never carry step-up.; packages/auth/src/auth.ts; packages/auth/src/mfa-enrolment.ts; packages/auth/src/principal.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/auth/src/step-up.test.ts; packages/auth/src/mfa-enrolment.test.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: Multi-factor authentication is not enforced for non-admin custodian members, editors or viewers, and federated SSO sessions rely on the identity provider. Trusting a device for 30 days skips TOTP. Phishing-resistant passkeys are optional rather than required, and there is no inline prompt to step up at the moment of a sensitive action, so the five minute window usually means a recent sign-in.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1173: partial. MFA for privileged users. IDG also requires re-authentication for sensitive actions.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1682: partial. Phishing-resistant MFA. IDG also requires re-authentication for sensitive actions.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1504: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) IA-11: partial. Re-authentication in organisation-defined circumstances. IDG names the sensitive actions.; Essential Eight Maturity Model (November 2023) Multi-factor authentication: partial. The Essential Eight requires MFA, and phishing-resistant MFA at higher maturity levels. IDG adds re-authentication for sensitive actions.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-03: supports
- Related: IDG-PPL-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-007 Joiners get the least access they need, once approved

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** A new member of the organisation's staff or contractors gets access to Indigenous data only after their role is approved, they have completed the required training and checks, and they have agreed in writing to the conditions that apply. They get the least access their role needs, and access to protocol-bound data only through the community's own appointment.

**Why.** Access given by default, or more broadly than needed, makes misuse easier and harder to notice.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Access requests are approved by a named person and recorded. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access is granted only after training, checks and signed conditions are recorded, and starts at the least privileged role. |
| IDG-ML3 | Provisioning is automated from an approved source, and access to each community's data needs that community's appointment. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, register, configuration, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: Users can be provisioned through SCIM, where groups map to exactly one role and a missing or conflicting mapping means no access. An accepted organisation invitation starts at the viewer role, and the signed-in email must match the invitation.; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.ts; packages/auth/src/organisation-collaboration.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.test.ts; Gaps: The product does not record training, checks or signed conditions. Invitations need no step-up, any email address can be invited, and an invited viewer has open-ended access. No automated test covers the viewer default for accepted invitations.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0405: partial. Validation of access requests. IDG adds training, checks and signed conditions first.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1852: partial. Least privilege. IDG adds approval, training and community appointment for protocol-bound data.; Essential Eight Maturity Model (November 2023) Restrict administrative privileges: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-2: partial. Account approval by the organisation. IDG adds training and signed conditions.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-6: partial. Least privilege only.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-6: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1508: partial. Least privilege for privileged access. IDG adds approval, training and community appointment for protocol-bound data.
- Related: IDG-PPL-003, IDG-PPL-004, IDG-PPL-008

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-PPL-008 Movers have their access reviewed

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When a person changes role, team or project, their access to Indigenous data is reviewed and reduced to what the new role needs when the change takes effect. Access they no longer need is removed, not left in place.

**Why.** People who move inside an organisation tend to collect access over time. Each move is the natural point to take back what is no longer needed.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Role changes trigger a manual access review, and the outcome is recorded. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access is adjusted on the day of the change, and existing sessions are ended. |
| IDG-ML3 | Role changes flow from an authoritative source, access is re-derived automatically, and a periodic review catches anything missed. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: procedure, register, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: When SCIM group membership changes, the user's role is re-derived from the mapped groups and their sessions are revoked immediately, and conflicting mappings mean no access. For users outside SCIM, an owner or admin with step-up can change another member's role.; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-groups.test.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.test.ts; Gaps: Nothing prompts an access review when someone moves. Custodian memberships and consultant engagements are not reviewed when a role changes.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-5: partial. The organisation sets the actions and timing. IDG requires review when the change takes effect.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-05: supports
- Related: IDG-PPL-007, IDG-PPL-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PPL-009 Leavers and project ends remove access promptly

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When a person leaves, or a project or engagement ends, all their access to Indigenous data is removed by the end of that day. This covers accounts, sessions, API keys, key custody duties, custodian appointments made for that role, and any copies of data they hold, which are returned or destroyed under the agreement.

**Why.** Former staff and finished projects are a common source of data that leaks long after anyone remembers it was shared.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A leaver checklist covers every kind of access and every copy, and is completed for each leaver and project end. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access is removed on the last day, and the removal is recorded and checked. |
| IDG-ML3 | Removal is automatic from an authoritative source, including sessions and API keys, and the community is told when someone with access to its data leaves. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, register, audit_log, attestation
- BlakSmith evidence: SCIM deprovisioning deletes the user's tenant-bound API keys, tenant membership, organisation and team rows, federated identities and all sessions in one transaction. A consultant or proponent engagement refuses access once it expires, whatever roles remain.; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-users.ts; packages/graph/src/engagement.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-groups-db.test.ts; packages/auth/src/scim-users.test.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: Deprovisioning leaves historical custodian membership and engagement records in place (though the user can no longer act in a custodian group without a tenant membership). Key custodian privileges held outside the application are not touched. Users who were not provisioned through SCIM cannot be removed in the application. Engagement expiry refuses access but does not end sessions or remove roles. The product does not track the return or destruction of copies.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0430: partial. Same day removal of system access. IDG adds return or destruction of copies and ending custodian and key duties.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1845: supports; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 186: partial. Access withdrawn on separation. IDG adds project end and return or destruction of copies.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-4: partial. Termination only, not project end.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1404: supports. Disables unprivileged access after 45 days of inactivity. IDG removes access when a person leaves or a project ends.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1648: supports. Disables privileged access after 45 days of inactivity. IDG removes access when a person leaves or a project ends.
- Related: IDG-PPL-002, IDG-PPL-008, IDG-PPL-011

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-PPL-010 Independent audit of access, visible to the community

Status: provisional. Version 5. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Someone independent of the people who operate the platform reviews access to Indigenous data on a set cycle. The community can see who accessed its data, when and for what stated purpose, including refused attempts and any emergency access.

**Why.** People who run a system should not be the only ones checking how it is used. Communities cannot hold anyone to account for access they cannot see.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Access logs are kept and reviewed by someone other than the platform operators at least once a year. |
| IDG-ML2 | The review is at least quarterly, and the community receives a report of access to its data. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community can see access to its data at any time, from a log that cannot be changed without detection. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: audit_log, report, meeting_record
- BlakSmith evidence: Access to custodian-bound records is written to a hash-chained audit log. The governance worker can publish a per-custodian-group access report, including refused reads, emergency access and unusual activity, with an anchored digest of the log.; packages/graph/src/access-transparency.ts; packages/graph/src/audit-chain.ts; packages/discovery/src/governance-worker.ts; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; @blaksmith/graph audit-chain-verify; Gaps: There is no auditor role and no in-app view of the report for the community. Reports are only written when the operator sets an export directory, and the operator decides how they reach the community. Reports select past access by each record's current custodian group, so if custody changes, earlier access can drop out of the original community's report or appear in the new group's.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) CA-7(1): partial. Independent assessment, but not visibility to the community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-6: partial. Audit review by the organisation, not reporting to the community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-9: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1815: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. The community can see who accessed its data. This record goes to the community, not the public.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3: partial. The Framework's ask that people can know how data about their interests is used covers part of this control. IDG adds independent review on a set cycle, and shows the community who accessed its data, when and for what stated purpose, including refused attempts and emergency access. G3 also asks that people know what data is held and how to access it, which no IDG control requires (see crosswalk-gaps.md).; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-assurance: supports. The governing body gets assurance through audit and independent assessment. IDG-PPL-010 also makes the record of access visible to the community.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0414: supports. Unique user identification is what lets the community see who accessed its data.
- Related: IDG-PPL-001, IDG-GOV-002

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).
- v4 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).
- v5 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-PPL-011 Outside parties have time-limited, purpose-limited access

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Consultants, contractors, proponents and other outside parties get access to Indigenous data only for a stated purpose and a fixed period, sponsored by a named person in the organisation. Access ends automatically at the end of that period, and outside parties cannot take away precise or culturally restricted material.

**Why.** Outside parties are often given access for one job and keep it long after. Their copies are also the hardest for a community to trace.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Each outside party's access has a sponsor, a purpose and an end date on record. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access is refused after the end date and outside the stated purpose, outside parties cannot export precise or culturally restricted material, and permitted exports are marked with who made them. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community approves each outside party's access to its data, and is told when it starts and ends. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: register, agreement, configuration, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: A consultant or proponent engagement has an end date, permitted purposes and a sponsor, and writes to engagement records are gated by authoriseEngagementWrite. Engagements are looked up directly by principal with no row cap, and a missing, malformed, unreadable or ambiguous engagement fails closed into a locked-out state. Access is refused after the end date whatever roles remain, and refused for a stated purpose outside the engagement's purposes. A proponent without custody is not shown existence-hidden material. Consultants cannot export culturally bound or encrypted material, and permitted exports are watermarked.; packages/graph/src/engagement.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/graph/src/engagement.test.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: The purpose limit applies only when a request states a purpose. The engagement's custodian group is used only in the watermark, and the community does not approve engagements directly in the product.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-7: partial. Personnel security for external providers. IDG adds a fixed end, stated purposes and export limits.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.SC-07: supports; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 75: partial. Need-to-know for people outside the entity. IDG adds a fixed end and export limits.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0441: partial. Restricts temporary access to the data needed. IDG adds a named sponsor, a fixed period that ends automatically, and no taking away precise or culturally restricted material.
- Related: IDG-PPL-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-PPL-012 Support for community data capability, on the community's terms

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Where a community wants it, the organisation supports the community to build the data capability it chooses, such as data literacy, skills, people and infrastructure to manage and govern its own data. The community decides whether it wants support, what kind and from whom. The organisation pays for the support it offers, and never makes it a condition of the community's authority over its data.

**Why.** CARE asks those who use Indigenous data to enhance data literacy in communities and support an Indigenous data workforce and infrastructure. Without that capability, a community's authority over its data is harder to use. Support that comes with conditions would become leverage over the community.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation asks each community it holds data about whether it wants data capability support, and records the answer. |
| IDG-ML2 | Support a community asks for is planned with it, paid for and delivered, and the community reviews whether it met its needs. |
| IDG-ML3 | Support includes things the community keeps, such as its own infrastructure, trained people or tools, and the organisation checks with the community whether its capability has grown. |

- CARE: R2: For expanding capability and capacity; C1: For inclusive development and innovation
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: register, agreement, report, meeting_record
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G2.6: partial. The Framework asks agencies to strengthen the data capability of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Controlled Organisations and other stakeholders. IDG leaves whether and how to the community.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G2: supports. Guideline 2 asks, among other things, to improve the capabilities of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander partners relating to Indigenous data. IDG-PPL-012 supports the capability the community chooses.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G2.10: supports. Covers checking with the community that capability building works.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.14: partial. The Framework asks for community-focussed data platforms and training. IDG asks for the support the community chooses, which may include these.
- Related: IDG-PPL-003, IDG-PRC-013

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.

## PRC: Process

### IDG-PRC-001 Data sharing agreements with required clauses

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

The clause list is compared with the BlakSmith agreement type in docs/idg/agreement-clauses.md.

**Control.** Indigenous data is shared only under a written agreement that the community's custodians have signed off. The agreement names the parties and the recipient, the purpose, the data in scope, the start and end dates, the formats allowed, where the data may be held, whether it may be shared onward, whether it may be used with AI, the benefit to the community, attribution, whether it is returned or destroyed at the end, breach notification, a ban on re-identification, and a review date. Clauses that are not filled in default to the most restrictive choice.

**Why.** An agreement is the community's main way to set the terms of use and to hold the recipient to them. Missing clauses are where misunderstandings and misuse start.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A written agreement with every required clause exists before any data is shared. |
| IDG-ML2 | Agreements are signed off by the community's custodians, kept in a register, and the systems that share data check an agreement is in place. |
| IDG-ML3 | Systems enforce each clause, so data outside the scope, formats, dates or purposes of an active agreement cannot be shared. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data; C3: For equitable outcomes
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: agreement, register, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Data sharing agreements record parties, custodian group, required custodian sign-offs, recipient organisation and contacts, dataset scope, start and end dates, allowed formats, purposes, residency, onward sharing, a no AI training term, attribution, benefit, return or destroy, destruction attestation, a review date and secrecy references. A sharing agreement becomes active only after approved members of the named custodian group sign off; tenant owners, admins and break-glass cannot sign. The full agreement can be exported as a document with every clause.; packages/core/src/governance/agreement.ts; packages/graph/src/governance-agreement.ts; packages/graph/src/sharing-agreement.ts; docs/idg/agreement-clauses.md; packages/graph/src/governance-agreement.test.ts; packages/graph/src/sharing-agreement.test.ts; packages/core/src/governance/governance.test.ts; Gaps: There is no structured breach notification clause on the agreement type yet. On legacy attached governance agreements outside the sharing-agreement workflow, purpose checks run only on protected material and above (or where a record carries its own allowed purposes or consent), an empty purpose list authorises every purpose, an omitted AI term allows AI use, and return or destroy defaults to retain under protocol.
- Crosswalks: Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 77: partial. PSPF requires an agreement before sharing. IDG also requires custodian sign-off and set clauses.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-21: partial. Sharing decisions by the organisation. IDG requires a signed agreement with set clauses.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.SC-05: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0072: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.1: partial. The agreement sets clear terms of use, as FAIR asks of a licence, but the community sets them and they bind a named recipient only.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1.5: supports. The Framework is about arrangements for sharing government-held data with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander stakeholders. IDG-PRC-001 governs any sharing of Indigenous data, and needs the community's custodians to sign off.
- Related: IDG-PRC-003, IDG-PRC-008, IDG-PRC-010, IDG-PRC-011

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PRC-002 Free, prior and informed consent before collection

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Before Indigenous data is collected, created or brought into a system, the organisation has the free, prior and informed consent of the community, given collectively by the people with authority to give it. The community was told the purpose and the risks, could refuse without penalty, and the consent is recorded with who gave it and for what.

**Why.** Consent given after the fact, by an individual on behalf of a collective, or without the option to refuse, is not consent the community can rely on.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Consent is obtained and recorded before collection, with who gave it, for what purpose and on what date. |
| IDG-ML2 | Systems refuse to ingest data that needs collective consent unless a consent record is supplied with it. |
| IDG-ML3 | Systems check the consent record against the community's own register before ingest, and keep it with the data. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: agreement, register, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Connector and evidence-drop batches that write kinds needing FPIC are refused unless they carry a consent record with a holder, at least one purpose, collective consent and an acknowledged right to refuse.; packages/core/src/governance/fpic.ts; packages/discovery/src/runner.ts; packages/discovery/src/evidence-ingest.ts; packages/core/src/governance/governance.test.ts; Gaps: The consent record is whatever the batch supplies. It is not checked against any stored consent and is not kept afterwards. The check does not cover records created through the API, web app or MCP, and one public register connector is exempt by name. In an evidence drop the connector name is declared by the sender, so any sender can claim that exemption.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-4: partial. Individual consent, not collective free, prior and informed consent.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-5: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 3: partial. Collection of personal information about individuals, not collective consent.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 5: partial. Notice to individuals, not collective consent.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.2: supports. The Framework asks agencies to partner on how data is collected. It names informed consent as a principle, but no action requires the community's collective free, prior and informed consent before collection, as IDG-PRC-002 does.
- Related: IDG-GOV-003, IDG-PRC-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PRC-003 Purpose limitation

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data is used only for the purposes the community agreed. Each access to sensitive material and above states its purpose, and an access for a purpose outside the agreement is refused. Running or administering the system is never a purpose that justifies reading culturally restricted material.

**Why.** Data collected for one purpose is often reused for another the community never agreed to. Purpose is the line the community drew.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Agreed purposes are written down, and staff are told not to use data for anything else. |
| IDG-ML2 | Systems require a stated purpose for access at these levels and refuse purposes outside the agreement. |
| IDG-ML3 | Stated purposes are checked against the person's role and agreement, and the community can see which purposes were used. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; relevant: Data that is relevant and empowers sustainable self-determination and effective self-governance.
- Evidence types: agreement, configuration, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Material at protected level and above needs a stated purpose. A purpose outside the material's allowed purposes, its consent or its agreement is refused, and system administration and statistical reporting are refused outright on culturally bound material. The purpose is written to the audit log. For consultants and proponents, a stated purpose is also checked against their engagement.; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/core/src/classification/cultural.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/graph/src/access-audit.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: The purpose is declared by the person or client making the request and, apart from engagements, is not checked against their role. Sensitive material does not require a purpose. When a record has its own allowed purposes, those decide on their own and are not narrowed by the consent's purposes.
- Crosswalks: Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 6: partial. APP 6 allows some uses beyond the primary purpose without consent.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-3: partial. Purposes set by the organisation, not agreed with the community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-2: supports; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) data-use-understanding: supports. The governing body should understand what data is used and for what purpose. IDG-PRC-003 limits each use to the purposes the community agreed and refuses others.
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-PRC-004 Approval for secondary use and derived data

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Any new use of Indigenous data, and any new dataset, model, report or other output derived from it, needs the community's approval before it is used or shared. Consent for the source data does not carry over to what is derived from it.

**Why.** Derived outputs can reveal as much as the source, and are often shared more widely. If consent carried over automatically, the community would lose control at the first derivation.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Secondary uses and derived outputs are listed and approved by the community before use. |
| IDG-ML2 | Derived records are created without consent and cannot be used until the community grants it. |
| IDG-ML3 | Derived outputs are tracked back to their sources, and the community reviews each one with any benefit it produces. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; C3: For equitable outcomes; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: register, agreement, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: When records are merged or derived, the result carries no consent. Where a source's ICIP terms say derivatives need consent, the result is marked as needing its own grant and purpose checks on it fail until one is given. Derived outputs can be registered as pending with a review task for the custodian group.; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/graph/src/benefits.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; packages/graph/src/benefits.test.ts; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; Gaps: Without that ICIP term, a derived record keeps only the overlap of its sources' allowed purposes, and if they do not overlap it has no purpose limit at all. Below protected level it has no purpose check. Nothing in the product calls the derived output registration outside tests. A reconcile write to an existing record can clear its live consent the same way, which fails closed at protected level and above but leaves lower-level material unconstrained.
- Crosswalks: Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 6: partial. APP 6 allows some secondary uses without consent. IDG requires community approval for every one.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-3: partial. No requirement that derived data needs fresh consent.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.1: supports. FAIR asks for clear terms of reuse. IDG does not rely on a licence: each secondary use and derived dataset needs the community's approval.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.8(b): supports. Covers the reuse phase. IDG requires the community's approval for each new use, which is more than partnering.
- Related: IDG-PRC-003, IDG-PRC-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PRC-005 Consent variation and withdrawal

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** A community can narrow, extend or withdraw its consent at any time. Narrowing and withdrawal take effect straight away. Broadening the purposes or extending the period is treated as a new grant that the community must give. The organisation records each change and who made it.

**Why.** Consent is an ongoing relationship, not a one-off form. A community's later decisions must carry the same weight as its first one.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Variations and withdrawals are accepted in writing and recorded. |
| IDG-ML2 | Systems apply a narrowing or withdrawal at once, and refuse to treat a broadening as anything but a new grant. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community makes variations and withdrawals directly, and can see their effect on every dataset and recipient. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: agreement, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Consent is granted with purposes and an optional end date. It can be narrowed but not broadened or extended, which must be a new grant, and revoked. Revocation and expiry make the next purpose check fail closed, and each change is an audited event.; packages/graph/src/consent-lifecycle.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; Gaps: Consent is granted, varied and revoked by tenant owners or admins, not by the community, and who granted it is free text. Open-ended grants stay in force until revoked. Narrowing is only reachable from the verify script, not from the web app, API or MCP. Refusal of revoked consent is unit tested, but the revoke operation itself is covered only by the verify script.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-4(3): partial. Individual revocation only.
- Related: IDG-GOV-003, IDG-PRC-006

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-006 Suspension when new information comes to light

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When new information arises that could change the community's decision, such as newly found cultural significance, the organisation suspends use under the affected consent at once, tells the community and anyone it must notify by law, and resumes only if the community gives consent again.

**Why.** Consent given on one set of facts does not cover facts the community did not know. Carrying on while the community reconsiders can cause harm that cannot be undone.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Staff know to stop and report when they learn something that could change the community's decision. |
| IDG-ML2 | Raising new information suspends the affected consent in the system and records who raised it and what was learned. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community and any statutory recipient are notified automatically, and use resumes only on a fresh grant. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Raising new information against material records a notice, suspends its consent so the next purpose check fails closed, and audits the event with the configured notification path.; packages/graph/src/consent-lifecycle.ts; packages/core/src/governance/statutory-notify.ts; packages/graph/src/consent-lifecycle.test.ts; Gaps: The notification step records a channel as dispatched but sends nothing. Only owners or admins with a recent step-up can raise new information, and it cannot be raised against material that has no consent grant. A suspension can only be lifted by a new grant.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: no equivalent. No control suspends use when new information could change a consent decision.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme: no equivalent. No principle suspends use when new information comes to light.
- Related: IDG-PRC-005, IDG-PRC-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-007 Periodic access review by the custodian group

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

The yearly minimum is an operator suggestion. The community may set its own interval.

**Control.** The community's custodians review who has access to their data, and why, at an interval they set and at least once a year. Access the custodians do not confirm is removed.

**Why.** Access tends to outlive the reason it was given. The people with authority over the data are best placed to say whether it is still needed.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A list of everyone with access to each community's data is given to its custodians each year. |
| IDG-ML2 | Custodians confirm or remove each person's access, and removals are carried out within an agreed time. |
| IDG-ML3 | Custodians run the review themselves in the system, and unconfirmed access is removed automatically. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: report, meeting_record, register
- BlakSmith evidence: The governance worker can publish a per-custodian-group report of granted and refused access, with unusual activity flagged, which supports a review.; packages/graph/src/access-transparency.ts; packages/discovery/src/governance-worker.ts; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; Gaps: The report shows past access, not who currently holds access. There is no review workflow, and reports are only produced when the operator sets an export directory.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-6(7): partial. Privileges are reviewed by the organisation, not by the community.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1647: partial. Revalidation of privileged access only, by the organisation.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-05: partial. Access is reviewed by the organisation, not the community.
- Related: IDG-PPL-010, IDG-PRC-008

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-008 Agreement review and expiry

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Every agreement has a review date and an end date. The organisation reviews it with the community by the review date, and when it ends, access under it stops and the return or destruction terms are carried out.

**Why.** Agreements left to run on their own outlast the people and purposes they were made for.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Each agreement has a review date and an end date in a register, and reviews are held. |
| IDG-ML2 | Reviews and expiries are raised automatically before they fall due. |
| IDG-ML3 | Expiry stops access automatically and starts the return or destruction process. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, agreement, meeting_record, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: The governance worker raises an agreement review task when an agreement's review date is due.; packages/core/src/governance/agreement.ts; packages/graph/src/consent-lifecycle.ts; packages/discovery/src/governance-worker.ts; packages/core/src/governance/governance.test.ts; Gaps: Agreements have no end date, so nothing expires. An agreement without a review date never raises a review. Review tasks are reminders only. The unit test covers the due-date check, not the worker creating the task.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-6: partial. Review of access agreements. IDG adds an end date that stops access and starts return or destruction.
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-009 Incident and breach notification to the community

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

Where an agreement sets no time, the operator suggests telling the community within 72 hours of becoming aware of the incident. This is a suggestion, not a legal requirement.

**Control.** When Indigenous data is lost, accessed without authority, disclosed or used outside the agreement, the organisation tells the affected community as soon as practicable and within the time set in the agreement. Unless the law prevents it, the community is never told later than anyone the law requires the organisation to notify. The notice says what happened, what data, what has been done and what the community can do, and the community is involved in the response.

**Why.** Legal breach schemes protect individuals. Harm to a community, such as disclosure of restricted knowledge, may not meet those thresholds at all, but the community still needs to know and to have a say in the response.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | An incident procedure names the community contact for each dataset and the time for notifying them. |
| IDG-ML2 | Every incident affecting Indigenous data is recorded with when the community was told, and the procedure is tested. |
| IDG-ML3 | Detection feeds the community notification directly, and the community takes part in the review of each incident. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; E2: For justice
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, register, report, agreement
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1880: partial. Reporting to customers. IDG requires telling the community and involving it in the response.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0133: partial. Advising data owners of a spill. The community may not be the data owner.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) NDB: partial. The scheme covers serious harm to individuals, not harm to a community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) IR-6: partial. Reporting to organisation-defined authorities, not the community.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) RS.CO-02: partial. Stakeholders are chosen by the organisation.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 26: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0142: supports. Reports a key compromise to the chief information security officer. If it may expose the data the key protects, IDG requires telling the community.
- Related: IDG-PRC-006

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-PRC-010 Destruction and attestation of destruction

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When an agreement ends or the community asks for destruction, the organisation destroys the data, including copies in backups, derived data and copies held by recipients. A named accountable person signs an attestation that lists what was destroyed, where, how and when, and the community receives it.

**Why.** Data that is meant to be gone often survives in backups, exports and derived files. A signed attestation makes someone accountable for finding every copy.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A destruction procedure covers primary copies, backups, derived data and recipients' copies. |
| IDG-ML2 | Each destruction is attested by a named accountable person and the attestation is given to the community. |
| IDG-ML3 | Encryption keys for the data are destroyed as part of the process, and the attestation is recorded in a tamper-evident log the community can check. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, attestation, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: Agreements record whether data is returned, destroyed or retained under protocol. Destroying a custodian group's encryption key with the erasure script makes the encrypted properties of that group's records unreadable, including in encrypted backups.; packages/core/src/governance/agreement.ts; infra/aws/scripts/erase-custodian-key.sh; docs/data-retention.md; packages/crypto/src/crypto.test.ts; Gaps: The return or destroy term is never acted on. There is no attestation record. Destroying a key leaves record names, graph structure, embedding text and derived records held under other keys readable, and nothing is encrypted when no key provider is configured. Key erasure is a manual script whose record is not written to the audit log. Plaintext that comes back in a restored backup is only handled by a manual runbook, and exports already taken are out of reach.
- Crosswalks: Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 73: partial. Secure disposal. IDG adds backups, derived data, recipients and a signed attestation.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) MP-6: partial. Sanitising media only.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-12(3): partial. Disposal after retention. IDG adds destruction on community request and an attestation.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0313: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 11: partial. Destroy or de-identify when no longer needed. IDG adds an attestation to the community.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0348: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0363: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1735: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-2053: supports. Asks software suppliers for end of life procedures that cover destroying data. IDG requires destruction whenever an agreement ends or the community asks, not only at a product's end of life.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories: no equivalent. TRUST asks repositories to preserve data for the long term. IDG requires data to be destroyed when the community asks or the agreement ends, and the destruction attested.
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-008, IDG-PRC-013, IDG-PPL-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-PRC-011 Onward sharing is controlled by the sharing organisation

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation sharing Indigenous data writes a ban on onward sharing into every agreement, allows an exception only where the community approves a named onward recipient, records each approval, and makes sure the onward recipient is bound by the same terms. The recipient's own obligation is IDG-CON-005.

**Why.** Each onward share moves the data further from the community's sight and control.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Every agreement bans onward sharing unless the community approves it. |
| IDG-ML2 | Each approved onward share is recorded with the community's approval and the terms that bind the onward recipient. |
| IDG-ML3 | Exports are traceable to the recipient, so an unapproved onward copy can be identified. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: agreement, register, attestation
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-21: partial. Sharing decisions by the organisation, not approval by the community.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 77: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 6: supports
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-012, IDG-CON-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Narrowed to the sharing organisation's side; the recipient's obligation moved to a CON control.

### IDG-PRC-012 Re-identification risk is controlled before release

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation sharing Indigenous data writes a ban on re-identification and unapproved linkage into every agreement, releases data at the least detail the purpose needs, and records any linkage the community has approved. The recipient's own obligation is IDG-CON-006.

**Why.** Removing names does not stop small populations from being identified. Linkage with other data is one of the most common ways that happens.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Every agreement bans re-identification and unapproved linkage. |
| IDG-ML2 | Data is released at the least detail the purpose needs, and approved linkages are recorded with the community's approval. |
| IDG-ML3 | Each release is assessed for re-identification risk before it leaves the organisation. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; E2: For justice
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: agreement, attestation, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-19: partial. De-identification techniques. IDG adds a ban on re-identification and linkage in every agreement.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-19(8): supports; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.12: supports. The Framework asks agencies to explore ways to promote collective or group privacy. IDG-PRC-012 sets a concrete rule for shared data: no re-identification or unapproved linkage, and the least detail the purpose needs.
- Related: IDG-PRC-011, IDG-CON-006

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Narrowed to the sharing organisation's side; the recipient's obligation moved to a CON control.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PRC-013 Return of data to the community

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: community. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The community can ask for its data back at any time, and receive it in a usable form with its classification, cultural protocols and agreements attached, so it can keep governing the data itself.

**Why.** Returning data is part of returning control. Data handed back without its protocols, or in a form the community cannot use, does not do that.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Data is returned on request, in a format agreed with the community. |
| IDG-ML2 | Returned data carries its classification, protocols and agreements, and the return is recorded. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community can retrieve its data itself at any time, in open formats, with its protocols intact. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; C3: For equitable outcomes
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).
- Evidence types: procedure, audit_log, report
- BlakSmith evidence: A repatriation package exports readable records with their classification, protocols and agreements, refuses a heritage export that would strip protocols, refuses consultants and proponents, and writes an audit event.; packages/graph/src/repatriation.ts; packages/core/src/governance/export-package.ts; packages/graph/src/repatriation.test.ts; Gaps: The package is a JSON download that any user who can read the records can produce, not a return under the community's control. There is no community self-service.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1574: partial. Portability between service providers. IDG requires return to the community with protocols attached.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.SC-10: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 12: partial. Access for an individual, not return to a community.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) sustainability: supports. TRUST keeps data available by having the repository preserve it. IDG makes sure the community can take its data back and keep it in its own care, whatever happens to the operator.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.3: partial. The Framework's process for people to request access to government-held data covers part of this control. IDG adds that the community can ask for its data back at any time and receives it in a usable form with its classification, cultural protocols and agreements attached. The Framework also asks for reasons for any refusal, response times and a right of review, which IDG-PRC-013 does not set.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.14: supports. The Framework asks for community-focussed platforms and training so communities can use and maintain their own data. IDG-PRC-013 only returns the data in a usable form.
- Related: IDG-GOV-003

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-PRC-014 Community data priorities

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation asks each community it holds data about what data the community wants collected, kept, analysed or made available to it, and for what purposes. It records those priorities, acts on them where it can, and tells the community what it has done, and why where it has not.

**Why.** Data that answers the organisation's questions but not the community's does little for self-determination. Asking the community what it needs is where relevant data starts.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation has asked each community it holds data about for its data priorities, and recorded them. |
| IDG-ML2 | Priorities are reviewed with the community at an interval it agrees, and the organisation reports what it has done on each. |
| IDG-ML3 | Community priorities shape what the organisation collects and analyses, and the community can point to decisions they changed. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; C1: For inclusive development and innovation
- Maiam nayri Wingara: relevant: Data that is relevant and empowers sustainable self-determination and effective self-governance.
- Evidence types: register, meeting_record, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.9: partial. The Framework's ask that agencies learn what additional or alternative data people want collected covers part of this control. IDG adds recording those priorities, acting on them where it can and telling the community what was done, and why where it was not. The Framework also asks for training community members to collect the data, which IDG does not require.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1: supports. Covers making sure the community's priorities are reflected in data about it.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001, IDG-PRC-015, IDG-PPL-012

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-015 Disaggregated data for the community on request

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When a community asks, the organisation gives it data about that community at the level of detail it asks for, such as for the community as a whole or for a Nation, language group or place the community names. The data goes through the people the community has authorised (IDG-GOV-001), with its cultural protocols still applied (IDG-TEC-002, IDG-GOV-002), so more detail does not lift a protocol on protocol-bound material within the community. Each person can get data about themselves, also with the community's cultural protocols applied. Data about other individuals is released only where the law and those people's own rights allow. If the organisation cannot meet a request, it says why and offers what it can.

**Why.** Data published only in aggregate hides differences between communities and is easily read as deficit. Communities need data at the level they choose in order to govern themselves. Giving more detail to the community is not the same as releasing it to others, so the protections in IDG-PRC-012 still apply to everyone outside the community's authority.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation can tell a community at what levels of detail it holds data about that community. |
| IDG-ML2 | Requests for disaggregated data are answered within a time agreed with the community, with reasons and alternatives for anything refused. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community can get data about itself at the levels it chooses without a separate request each time, under its own access rules. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; C2: For improved governance and citizen engagement
- Maiam nayri Wingara: contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).
- Evidence types: procedure, register, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.11: exceeds. The Framework asks agencies to explore releasing disaggregated data when partners ask, where legally and ethically acceptable. IDG requires an answer, with reasons and alternatives for anything refused.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.3: supports. Covers giving reasons and alternatives when a request is refused.
- Related: IDG-GOV-001, IDG-GOV-002, IDG-TEC-002, IDG-PRC-012, IDG-PRC-013, IDG-PRC-014

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.

### IDG-PRC-016 Data stewardship and data quality reviewed with the community

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Each set of Indigenous data the organisation holds has a named data steward (IDG-PPL-001), who keeps a record of where the data came from, how it was collected and what it can and cannot support. The community can review the data about it, have errors corrected and have its own context recorded with the data.

**Why.** Inaccurate or decontextualised data about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people has long been used to tell deficit stories. Quality judged only by the organisation repeats that. The community knows things about the data that the organisation does not.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Each set of Indigenous data has a named steward and a record of its source, how it was collected and its known limitations. |
| IDG-ML2 | The community can ask for errors to be corrected and context to be added. The organisation acts on each request and records what it did. |
| IDG-ML3 | Data quality is reviewed with the community at an interval it agrees, and the community's view of the data's quality is recorded with the data. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; E3: For future use; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, procedure, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.8: partial. The Framework's ask to improve the quality of Indigenous data, including BADDR data, in partnership covers part of this control. IDG adds a named steward, a record of where the data came from and what it can and cannot support, and correction and context from the community. The Framework also asks for better identification of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in mainstream data collection (its item a), which IDG does not require.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.2: supports. The steward's record of source and collection method is part of the data's provenance.
- Related: IDG-PPL-001, IDG-CON-010, IDG-TEC-002

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-03): First provisional draft.

## TEC: Technology

### IDG-TEC-001 Every record carries a classification that can only be raised automatically

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Every record of Indigenous data carries a sensitivity classification from an ordered scale. When records are combined or reconciled, the result takes the strictest classification of its sources. Automated processes may raise a classification but never lower it; lowering needs a deliberate, authorised and recorded decision.

**Why.** Access, encryption and export decisions all depend on the classification. If a sync job or a merge can quietly lower it, every other control is undone.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A classification scheme exists and is applied to Indigenous data, with a recorded default. |
| IDG-ML2 | Systems store a classification on every record and take the strictest level when records are combined. |
| IDG-ML3 | Automated lowering is impossible, every change is recorded with who made it, and history reads at the current level. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: Every node, edge and document carries a classification from a five-level ladder. Merging takes the strictest level and protocols. Reconciliation can raise but never lower a classification; only an explicit change by a human owner or admin with step-up can. Node history and as-of reads are shown at least as strict as the node's current level.; packages/core/src/classification/levels.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; docs/data-classification.md; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; Gaps: The default level is internal, so data imported without a classification is not treated as sensitive. Edge history and as-of edge reads use the edge's historical classification, so a raised edge can still be read at its earlier level.
- Crosswalks: Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 59: partial. The originator assesses sensitivity. IDG adds that automated processes may only raise a classification.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 60: partial. PSPF sets classification at the lowest reasonable level. IDG adds that only a deliberate decision may lower it.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-16: partial. Security attributes in general. IDG adds the raise-only rule.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1: supports. Every record carries an accurate sensitivity classification, one of the attributes reuse depends on.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0393: partial. The ISM classifies databases and their contents by the data they hold, which covers part of this control. IDG adds that every record carries its own classification, that combined records take the strictest level, and that automated processes can only raise a classification. IDG-TEC-001 does not require the database itself to be classified, as the ISM does.
- Related: IDG-TEC-002, IDG-TEC-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-002 Cultural protocols and Local Contexts labels travel with the data

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

TK (Traditional Knowledge) and BC (Biocultural) Labels are published by Local Contexts, checked at localcontexts.org on 1 November 2026.

**Control.** Cultural protocols and Local Contexts Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Biocultural (BC) labels are stored with each record they apply to, enforced by the system where they restrict access or use, and carried with the record into every copy, export and derived record.

**Why.** A protocol that lives in a separate document is lost the first time the data is copied. Labels only protect anything if systems act on them.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Protocols and labels are recorded against the records they apply to. |
| IDG-ML2 | Protocols that restrict access or use are enforced by the system, and labels are included in every export. |
| IDG-ML3 | Every label's meaning is enforced, labels are kept in sync with the community's own Local Contexts records, and derived records inherit them. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R3: For Indigenous languages and worldviews
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Records carry cultural protocols, each with a minimum level, custodian requirement and presentation flags, plus Local Contexts TK labels. Merged records keep the union of protocols. Seasonal labels restrict access to community-supplied windows. The Non-Commercial label refuses commercial use wherever a purpose check runs. TK labels can be resynced from the Local Contexts Hub.; packages/core/src/classification/cultural.ts; packages/core/src/classification/tk-labels.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/discovery/src/local-contexts.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; Gaps: BC labels are not supported. Only the Seasonal and Non-Commercial labels are enforced, and Non-Commercial is not checked on internal or sensitive records that have no purpose limit, consent or other constraint. Labels such as secret or sacred, men restricted, women restricted and community use only restrict nothing unless a matching cultural protocol is also set. Gender-restricted protocols are enforced through custodian group membership, not by checking gender.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-16: partial. Attributes chosen by the organisation. IDG requires cultural protocols and labels set by the community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-16(5): supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.1: partial. FAIR asks for a clear usage licence. IDG carries the community's protocols and labels with the data and enforces them, which a licence alone does not do.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.3: partial. Local Contexts labels are a community standard for Indigenous data. IDG enforces them as well as recording them.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) user-focus: partial. TRUST asks repositories to meet the norms of their user communities. IDG carries and enforces the norms of the community the data is about, through its protocols and labels, whether or not that community uses the system.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.5(a): supports. The Framework asks for metadata flags to make data findable and align it with FAIR and CARE. IDG's labels carry the community's protocols and are enforced. They are not for findability.
- Related: IDG-TEC-001, IDG-TEC-008, IDG-TEC-014

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-TEC-003 Existence of restricted records fails closed

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: protected, restricted, protocol-bound data only.

**Control.** Where a community's protocol requires it, a person without authority cannot learn that a restricted record exists: it does not appear in search, lists, counts, maps, graphs or error messages. When the system cannot tell whether someone may know, it hides the record.

**Why.** For some knowledge, revealing that a record exists, or where it is, is itself the harm.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Restricted records are left out of the main search and listing screens for people without authority. |
| IDG-ML2 | Every read path, including search, counts, maps, exports and error messages, hides the record's existence. |
| IDG-ML3 | Hiding is tested automatically across every read path on each change. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Protocols can hide a record's existence from anyone without custody, and the check fails closed when authority is not established. In the web app a refused read of a hidden record looks the same as a missing one, and proponents without custody are not shown hidden material.; packages/core/src/classification/existence.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/graph/src/classified-read.ts; packages/core/src/classification/existence.test.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; Gaps: The REST API and MCP word the not-found error differently for a missing record, which includes its ID, and a hidden one, which does not, so a caller can tell that a hidden record exists. No single test covers every read path, such as search, counts and maps.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3: supports. IDG also hides that a record exists.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) responsibility: supports. TRUST asks repositories to protect sensitive information. Hiding that a restricted record exists is one way IDG does this.; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. No control requires hiding the existence of a record.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship: no equivalent. No FAIR principle requires hiding that a record exists. FAIR allows access control on metadata (A1.2) and does not require a public index (F4), so a FAIR repository can hide restricted records, but IDG requires it where a community protocol asks.
- Related: IDG-TEC-002

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-004 Encryption at rest for sensitive Indigenous data

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Sensitive Indigenous data is encrypted at rest at the application level, in addition to any storage encryption, with a fresh data key for each item and authenticated encryption. Plaintext does not appear in database columns, version history or backups.

**Why.** Storage encryption protects against a stolen disk, not against anyone with database access. Application-level encryption keeps the data unreadable to people who can read the database.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Storage holding Indigenous data is encrypted at rest. |
| IDG-ML2 | Sensitive fields are encrypted by the application before they are stored, including in history and backups. |
| IDG-ML3 | All content, including names and derived search data, is encrypted, and a scheduled check proves no plaintext is stored. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Record properties at sensitive level and above are sealed with AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, a fresh data key and IV per payload, and the encryption context as additional authenticated data, before they are written to rows or version snapshots. The verify script checks the secret is absent from the database column and from every snapshot.; packages/crypto/src/envelope.ts; packages/crypto/src/fields.ts; packages/crypto/src/resolve.ts; packages/crypto/src/crypto.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph encryption-verify; Gaps: Only property values are sealed. Record names, kinds, graph structure and embedding text are stored in plaintext, as are property names and the classification itself. Unless NODE_ENV is production, a deployment with no key provider configured stores properties in plaintext. The server decrypts in memory, so this is not end to end encryption.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1080: partial. Approved algorithms only. IDG adds application-level encryption and no plaintext in history or backups.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-28: partial. Storage encryption can satisfy SC-28. IDG adds application-level encryption with a fresh key per item.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-28(1): partial. IDG adds application-level encryption with a fresh key per item.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-01: partial. An outcome statement. IDG sets the mechanism.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) responsibility: supports. Authenticated encryption detects changes to stored data.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) technology: supports. Encryption at rest is part of a secure service.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1059: partial. Encrypts all data on media with ASD-approved cryptography. IDG adds application-level encryption with a fresh data key for each item.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1811: supports. Keeps backups secure. IDG also keeps plaintext out of backups.
- Related: IDG-TEC-005, IDG-TEC-006

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-005 Encryption in transit

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data is encrypted whenever it crosses a network, using current TLS, with certificates verified, and unencrypted connections refused or redirected.

**Why.** Data crossing a network unencrypted can be read or altered by anyone on the path.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Public endpoints use TLS and redirect plain HTTP. |
| IDG-ML2 | Connections to databases, storage and between services are encrypted, and secure cookies are required. |
| IDG-ML3 | Every connection, including inside private networks, uses TLS with certificate verification, and weak protocols are refused. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: The Terraform load balancer serves TLS 1.2 or 1.3, the CDK one TLS 1.3, and both redirect HTTP. The database forces TLS and the application connects with TLS required. Storage buckets refuse non-TLS requests. In production, authentication requires HTTPS origins and secure cookies.; infra/aws/terraform/app.tf; infra/aws/terraform/data.tf; packages/db/src/environment.ts; packages/auth/src/auth.ts; packages/auth/src/auth.test.ts; Gaps: Traffic from the load balancer to the application, and between the web app and the API, is plain HTTP inside the private network. The database connection encrypts but does not verify the server certificate. There are no site-wide HSTS or content security policy headers.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1139: partial. Latest TLS only. IDG adds certificate verification and refusing plain connections.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-8: partial. Confidentiality or integrity, by any mechanism. IDG requires both, with TLS.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-8(1): partial. IDG adds certificate verification and refusing plain connections.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-02: partial. An outcome statement. IDG sets the mechanism.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) technology: supports. Encryption in transit is part of a secure service.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1781: partial. Encrypts all network traffic with ASD-approved cryptography. IDG adds certificate verification.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1277: supports
- Related: IDG-TEC-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-006 Key custody options up to community-held keys

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The keys that protect a community's data can be held by the operator, by the customer organisation, or by the community itself, as the community chooses. Keys for different custodian groups are separate, and a community's key is never placed in operator escrow.

**Why.** Whoever holds the key decides whether the data can be read. A community that holds its own key can withdraw access without asking anyone.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Keys for Indigenous data are managed in a key management service, separate from the data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Each custodian group has its own key, and community keys are never escrowed by the operator. |
| IDG-ML3 | A community can hold its own key in its own account, and every use of it is visible to the community. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: configuration, register, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: Each tenant chooses vendor, customer, customer with escrow, or external key custody. Custodian groups can have their own keys, which are looked up before the tenant key and are never stored with vendor escrow. A documented option lets a community hold its own key in its own AWS account.; packages/crypto/src/key-custody.ts; packages/crypto/src/community-keys.ts; docs/key-custody.md; infra/aws/community-key/README.md; packages/crypto/src/key-custody.test.ts; Gaps: The tenant, not the community, sets the custody mode. Records with joint custodians are sealed under the first group's key only. A community key registration is an ordinary record kind that anyone who can create records can write, and registrations are not separated by tenant, so a registration could point a custodian group at an unintended key. The registration service itself has no caller in the product. No live cross-account or recovery drill has been run, and community-side key policy changes do not reach the operator's alerts.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SA-9(6): partial. Organisation-controlled keys, not community-held keys.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-12: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0507: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) technology: supports. Key management is part of a secure service. IDG also lets the community hold the keys.
- Related: IDG-TEC-007, IDG-PPL-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-007 Cryptographic erasure per custodian group

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** A community can have its data made permanently unreadable by destroying the key that protects it, without affecting any other community's data. The erasure is authorised, recorded and reported to the community.

**Why.** Deleting every copy of data, including backups, is hard to prove. Destroying the only key makes every encrypted copy unreadable at once.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A documented procedure can destroy a custodian group's key on the community's request. |
| IDG-ML2 | Erasure affects only that group's data, needs a recorded reference and reason, and is logged. |
| IDG-ML3 | Erasure is tested in a live drill, recorded in the tamper-evident audit log, and confirmed to the community. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Each custodian group's payloads are sealed under that group's key. A unit test shows, within one local provider instance, that blocking one group's key leaves other groups readable. The erasure script schedules deletion of the group's KMS key after a reference, justification and typed confirmation.; packages/crypto/src/fields.ts; infra/aws/scripts/erase-custodian-key.sh; docs/key-custody.md; packages/crypto/src/crypto.test.ts; Gaps: The local provider test does not prove permanent erasure: a fresh provider instance can decrypt again. Statutory overlay material for a group is sealed under a separate key the script does not destroy, records sealed under another joint custodian's key survive, and under customer custody without a group key material falls back to the tenant key, so per-group erasure is not possible. Erasure leaves names, graph structure and embedding text readable. There is no in-app erasure path, the script's record is printed rather than written to the audit log, and no live erasure drill has been run.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) MP-6: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-12: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories: no equivalent. TRUST asks repositories to preserve data for the long term. IDG lets a community make its data unreadable for good by destroying its key.; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. No ISM control lets a community make its data unreadable by destroying its key. Two ISM controls pull the other way. ISM-0455 asks, where practical, for a way to recover data when a key is unavailable; IDG makes a community's data unrecoverable when its key is destroyed, and never places a community's key in escrow (IDG-TEC-006). ISM-2151 asks for backups that cannot be deleted during their retention period; destroying the key is how IDG makes copies in such backups unreadable.
- Related: IDG-TEC-006, IDG-PRC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-008 Access control that operator roles cannot override

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted, protocol-bound data only.

**Control.** The system enforces, in code that every read path uses, that protocol-bound data can only be read by people the community has authorised. No administrator role, platform account, service account, AI agent or emergency access mechanism can bypass that check.

**Why.** A rule that an administrator can switch off protects nothing against the administrator. This is the technical side of IDG-GOV-002.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Access to protocol-bound data is limited by configuration to authorised people. |
| IDG-ML2 | A single enforcement point checks custodian authority on every read, and refuses administrators, service accounts and AI agents without it. |
| IDG-ML3 | The refusal is tested automatically on every change, including for emergency access and every API surface. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: One decision function checks custodian authority before clearance on every classified read. For protocols that require custodian authority, it refuses the tenant owner, API keys and AI agents without custody, and break-glass cannot help. The refusal is unit tested and exercised by the verify scripts.; packages/authz/src/classified.ts; packages/graph/src/classified-read.ts; packages/authz/src/classified.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph classification-verify; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; Gaps: The deceased person protocol does not require custodian authority, so those records are gated by clearance, which break-glass can override. An empty custodian group's first members are bootstrapped by two owners or admins (never adding an owner or admin) and remain provisional pending community confirmation (issue #286). The database owner connection is not subject to these checks.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3: partial. Access enforcement in general. IDG adds that no administrator, service account or emergency access can bypass it.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3(10): exceeds. IDG allows no override for protocol-bound data.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.AA-05: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1268: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) A1.2: exceeds. FAIR allows authentication and authorisation where necessary. IDG requires a check, set by the community, that no operator role can bypass.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) responsibility: supports. TRUST asks repositories to protect sensitive information and keep the system secure. IDG also stops operator roles from overriding the community's access decisions.
- Related: IDG-GOV-002, IDG-TEC-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-009 Tenant isolation enforced by the database

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Where one system holds data for more than one organisation or community, the database itself refuses to return or change another tenant's data, even if application code has a bug, and fails closed when no tenant is set.

**Why.** Application checks can be forgotten in one query. A database-level rule catches the query that was missed.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Tenant data is separated by application checks on every query. |
| IDG-ML2 | Database row-level security restricts every tenant table, and the application connects with a role that is subject to it. |
| IDG-ML3 | Isolation is verified automatically against a live database on every change, and no routine process runs with a role that bypasses it. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Row-level security policies scope every tenant table to the current tenant. The application role sees nothing when no tenant is set, cannot write across tenants, and cannot read session data. Live verify scripts check this against Postgres.; docs/security-rls.md; packages/db/src/tenant-scope.ts; packages/db/src/data-plane.ts; @blaksmith/graph rls-verify; @blaksmith/graph rls-enforcement-verify; Gaps: Policies are not forced on the table owner, and authentication, the worker's tenant listing and retention use the owner connection. Unless NODE_ENV is production, an unset application database URL silently falls back to the owner connection, so row-level security is not enforced.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SC-4: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1268: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) A1.2: supports. Tenant isolation is part of the authorisation that keeps one community's data from another.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) responsibility: supports. Database-enforced tenant isolation protects each community's sensitive information.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) technology: supports. Database-enforced tenant isolation is part of a secure service.
- Related: IDG-TEC-008

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-010 Tamper-evident audit log

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Every access to and change of Indigenous data, including refused attempts, is written to an append-only log in which any alteration, deletion or reordering can be detected. The log is kept for at least as long as the data and its agreements.

**Why.** An audit log that an insider can edit cannot settle a dispute about what happened.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Access and changes are logged and the log is protected from routine editing. |
| IDG-ML2 | The log is hash-chained so changes are detectable, and the application cannot update or delete entries. |
| IDG-ML3 | The chain is verified on a schedule and its head is anchored outside the operator's control. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; A2: Data for governance
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: audit_log, configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Events are chained by SHA-256 over the previous hash and the canonical event. Unique database constraints refuse duplicate predecessors, duplicate sequence numbers and a second genesis event per tenant, and the application role cannot update or delete events or version snapshots. The verify script detects modification, deletion and truncation.; packages/graph/src/audit-chain.ts; packages/db/drizzle/0007_audit_hash_chain.sql; @blaksmith/graph audit-chain-verify; Gaps: The database owner role can still rewrite the chain. The hash column is nullable and verification counts an event without a hash as unchained rather than failing. The chain is not verified on a schedule.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-9: partial. Protects audit information. IDG adds logging every access, including refusals, in a chain that shows tampering.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-12: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-11: partial. Retention for an organisation-defined period. IDG keeps logs as long as the data and its agreements.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-10: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1815: partial. Protection from modification and deletion. IDG adds detection of reordering and logging of refusals.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1988: partial. At least 12 months. IDG keeps logs as long as the data and its agreements.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.PS-04: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.2: supports. The log records every change to the data, which is part of its provenance.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) responsibility: supports. The log records every change to holdings, and any alteration of that record can be detected.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1405: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1985: supports. Protects event logs from unauthorised access. IDG also gives the community the record for its own data (IDG-PPL-010).; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0988: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1989: partial. Retention set by the National Archives of Australia's AFDA Express. IDG keeps logs at least as long as the data and its agreements.
- Related: IDG-TEC-011, IDG-PPL-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-011 Communities can verify the audit record independently

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: community. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** A community can receive the audit record for its data, and a digest anchored outside the operator's control, and check for itself that nothing has been changed or removed.

**Why.** Transparency the community cannot check is a promise, not evidence.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The community can ask for and receive the access record for its data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access reports and digests of the audit log are published to the community on a schedule. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community can verify an export of the log against an anchored digest with its own tools. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: report, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: The audit chain can be exported and verified offline against a digest, and the verify scripts check that. The governance worker can publish per-custodian-group access reports and a digest of the chain head to an export directory, creating each file once without overwriting it.; packages/graph/src/access-transparency.ts; packages/discovery/src/governance-worker.ts; @blaksmith/discovery governance-verify; @blaksmith/graph audit-chain-verify; Gaps: The digest comes from the operator's own database and is written as an ordinary file, so it is not anchored outside the operator's control unless the deployment adds immutable storage. Reports and digests are only published when the operator mounts an export directory. Nothing in the product calls the chain export, and the export covers the whole tenant, so giving it to one community would disclose other communities' events. There is no in-app route for the community to fetch or verify anything.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-9(2): supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. The community can verify the audit record against a digest the operator does not control.; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. No control gives the community the data is about a way to verify the audit record.
- Related: IDG-TEC-010, IDG-PPL-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-012 Data residency onshore by default

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data, its backups and its keys stay in the jurisdiction the community agreed, which defaults to Australia. Deployments outside the agreed regions are refused, and data is not sent to services in other jurisdictions without the community's agreement.

**Why.** Where data is held decides which laws can reach it. Communities need to know and agree where that is.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The hosting region is documented and agreed with the community. |
| IDG-ML2 | Infrastructure fails to deploy outside the agreed regions, including backups and keys. |
| IDG-ML3 | Every service that processes the data, including AI and support tools, is checked against the agreed jurisdiction before use. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, agreement, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: The CDK app fails synthesis outside an allow-listed region, Sydney by default, and CI asserts the guard fires. Terraform has the same allow-list. Records can carry a residency that blocks sending them to an external AI model when cross-border transfer is not permitted.; infra/aws/cdk/lib/region-guard.ts; infra/aws/terraform/versions.tf; infra/aws/terraform/variables.tf; packages/ai/src/governance.ts; .github/workflows/ci.yml; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; Gaps: The community-held key module has no region guard. At runtime residency only blocks external AI processing, and no automated test covers that refusal. Records have no residency by default, and the agreement's residency term is not enforced.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1572: partial. Regions are documented in contracts. IDG defaults to Australia and needs the community to agree.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SA-9(5): partial. Locations set by the organisation. IDG defaults to Australia and needs the community to agree.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) CM-12: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 8: partial. Safeguards for overseas disclosure. IDG keeps data in the agreed jurisdiction.
- Related: IDG-TEC-013, IDG-TEC-016

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-TEC-013 Sub-processors are disclosed

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation tells the community which third parties host, process or support its data, where they are, and what they can access, and tells the community before adding or changing one.

**Why.** A community cannot agree to where its data goes if it does not know who else handles it.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A current list of sub-processors, their locations and their access is available to the community. |
| IDG-ML2 | The community is told before a sub-processor is added or changed, and can object. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community's agreement is needed before a new sub-processor can handle its data. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, agreement, policy
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1637: partial. A register for the organisation. IDG requires disclosure to the community.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1572: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SA-9: partial. Oversight of providers by the organisation. IDG requires disclosure to the community.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.SC-07: supports; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 40: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. The community is told who hosts and processes its data. TRUST asks for this to be public, and IDG asks for it to go to the community.
- Related: IDG-TEC-012

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.

### IDG-TEC-014 Exports only under an agreement, with protocols attached

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data leaves the system only for a person and purpose covered by an active agreement, in a format the agreement allows. Every export carries the data's classification, protocols, labels and agreement, and is recorded and traceable to the person who made it.

**Why.** Exports are where data leaves the controls that protect it. If protocols do not travel with the data, the recipient has no way to respect them.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Exports of Indigenous data are approved and recorded. |
| IDG-ML2 | Exports carry classification, protocols and agreements, refuse material that would lose its protocols, and are watermarked for outside parties. |
| IDG-ML3 | The system refuses any export not covered by an active agreement for that recipient, scope and format. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: audit_log, system_check, agreement
- BlakSmith evidence: Trusted dataset sharing packages are built only under an active, custodian-signed data sharing agreement, scoped to the agreement's dataset and allowed formats, sealed for the recipient and carrying classification, protocols, labels and agreement metadata with a fresh consent and expiry check on download. Repatriation packages include only records the person may read with protocols attached, refuse a heritage export that would strip protocols, and write an audit event. Explorer data exports are capped at 200 records and watermarked for anyone under an engagement; proponents cannot export, and consultants cannot export culturally bound or encrypted material.; packages/graph/src/dataset-package.ts; packages/graph/src/sharing-agreement.ts; packages/graph/src/repatriation.ts; packages/core/src/governance/export-package.ts; packages/graph/src/explorer-export.ts; packages/graph/src/dataset-package.test.ts; packages/graph/src/repatriation.test.ts; packages/graph/src/explorer-export.test.ts; Gaps: Direct Explorer data exports and repatriation exports for internal users not under an engagement are not gated by an active sharing agreement. Explorer image exports carry no classification, protocols, labels, agreements or watermark.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-21: partial. Sharing decisions by the organisation. IDG requires an active agreement and protocols in every export.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-3(9): partial. Controlled release. IDG requires an active agreement and protocols in every export.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-4: supports; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 77: partial. An agreement before sharing. IDG adds allowed formats and protocols in every export.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.1: partial. Every export carries the agreement that sets its terms of use. IDG also limits each export to a recipient and purpose the agreement covers.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.2: supports. Every export is recorded and traceable to the person who made it.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0663: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0661: partial. A person is accountable for each transfer. IDG also requires an active agreement and carries the data's protocols with every export.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1187: supports. IDG attaches each record's classification and protocols to every export. It does not require a manual check of markings.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1586: partial. Logs every import and export. IDG-TEC-014 records exports only, and adds the agreement each one was made under.
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-011, IDG-PRC-013, IDG-TEC-015

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-015 Presentation controls on display and export

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted, protocol-bound data only.

**Control.** Where a community's protocol requires it, the system generalises the location of sensitive places, suppresses names and images of people who have died, and shows required warnings and attribution, on every screen and in every export.

**Why.** Showing a sacred site's exact location, or the image of someone who has passed, can cause real harm, even to people allowed to know the record exists.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Staff follow written rules for showing locations, deceased persons and warnings. |
| IDG-ML2 | The system applies generalisation, suppression, warnings and attribution on display. |
| IDG-ML3 | The same controls apply to every export and API, at a level of detail the community sets. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; R3: For Indigenous languages and worldviews
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.; contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).
- Evidence types: configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Sacred site geometry is generalised to a grid cell, by default 10 kilometres or the community's chosen size, which the verify script checks with a 25 kilometre cell. Dataset packages filter sacred site records through a strict property allowlist and drop coordinate-shaped values before release. Reads of protocol-bound records suppress set property keys for deceased persons' names, and add access warnings and attribution.; packages/graph/src/spatial.ts; packages/graph/src/location.ts; packages/graph/src/classified-read.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.ts; packages/core/src/classification/classification.test.ts; packages/graph/src/location.test.ts; @blaksmith/graph spatial-verify; Gaps: Generalisation on interactive reads covers stored geometries for the sacred site protocol, while property-level coordinate filtering runs on dataset packages rather than every interactive read. Suppression removes a fixed list of property keys, and a deceased person's story, images and voice are removed only when the name is also suppressed. The community's cell size can only be set outside the product.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-16(5): supports; Information Security Manual (ISM): no equivalent. No control generalises locations or suppresses content about people who have died.
- Related: IDG-TEC-014

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-TEC-016 Retention limits and verified purge, including backups

Status: provisional. Version 3. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data and records about access to it are kept only as long as the agreement and the law require. At the end of that time they are purged by a scheduled process, the purge is recorded, and backups expire or are purged within a stated time.

**Why.** Data kept past its purpose is still at risk, and still outside the community's control.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A retention schedule covers each kind of Indigenous data and its backups. |
| IDG-ML2 | A scheduled process purges data at the end of its retention period, and backups expire within a stated time. |
| IDG-ML3 | Each purge is recorded in the tamper-evident log, verified, and reapplied after any restore from backup. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: policy, configuration, audit_log, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: An hourly worker job purges expired sessions and ingestion ledger rows older than 90 days. The retention document sets out the schedule for each table, and automated database backups are kept for 35 days.; packages/graph/src/retention.ts; apps/worker/src/retention-job.ts; apps/worker/src/server.ts; docs/data-retention.md; infra/aws/terraform/data.tf; packages/graph/src/retention.test.ts; Gaps: Only sessions and ingestion ledger rows are purged; the rest of the schedule is policy. Events and version snapshots, which include plaintext names, are kept with no end date. Evidence objects are under a seven year compliance object lock that no one can shorten, so they cannot be purged at the end of an agreement or on request, and the documents bucket has no expiry. The production database keeps a final snapshot with no expiry, and automated backups are not deleted with it. The purge is logged, not written to the audit chain. The retention verify script checks the selector without a database and is not run in CI. No restore drill has been run, and reapplying erasures after a restore is manual.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-12: partial. Retention set by law and policy. IDG adds limits set by the agreement and verified purge.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-12(3): partial. Disposal after retention. IDG adds recording and verifying each purge.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1511: supports; Essential Eight Maturity Model (November 2023) Regular backups: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 11: partial. Destroy or de-identify when no longer needed. IDG adds backups and a recorded, verified purge.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-11: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1547: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship: no equivalent. FAIR A2 asks for metadata to stay accessible after the data is gone. IDG purges the data and the records about access to it when the agreement ends. The destruction attestation (IDG-PRC-010) is what remains.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories: no equivalent. TRUST asks repositories to preserve data for the long term. IDG requires data to be purged when its agreement ends, or destroyed when the community asks.
- Related: IDG-PRC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
- v3 (2026-11-03): Mapped to further data-related ISM controls (September 2026).

### IDG-TEC-017 AI and model training restrictions

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Indigenous data is not used to train or tune AI models, and is not sent to an AI service, unless the community has agreed to that use. Culturally restricted material is never placed in search indexes or embeddings that AI features read from without that agreement.

**Why.** Once knowledge is in a model it cannot be taken back out, and the model can surface it to anyone.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Policy prohibits AI training on, or AI processing of, Indigenous data without agreement. |
| IDG-ML2 | Systems refuse to send restricted material to external AI services and leave it out of embeddings. |
| IDG-ML3 | Every AI feature, local or external, checks the agreement and consent before use, and the community can see where AI was used. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: policy, configuration, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: Culturally bound, Local Contexts labelled and existence-hidden records are not embedded. Sending material to an external model is refused when residency forbids cross-border transfer, when an agreement forbids AI use, or when culturally bound material lacks AI processing consent. Agent conversations take on the strictest classification of what they read.; packages/ai/src/governance.ts; packages/search/src/search.ts; packages/agents/src/loop.ts; @blaksmith/search verify; Gaps: There is no training pipeline, so the no AI training term in practice means no AI processing. Local chat and agent models get no check at all. With a local embedding model, material under a no AI term and sensitive material without a cultural protocol are still embedded, and the embedded text is stored in plaintext. The external check ignores the statutory overlay purpose bans, agreement purpose lists and the derived consent flag. No automated test covers the external refusal or the classification of agent conversations; the search verify script checks only that protocol-bound records are not embedded.
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-2074: supports; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-2112: supports
- Related: IDG-PRC-001, IDG-PRC-003, IDG-PRC-004, IDG-TEC-012

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

## ASR: Assurance

### IDG-ASR-001 Regular CARE and FAIR maturity self-assessment with community review

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

Applies across every domain and lifecycle stage held in scope. See docs/idg/self-assessment.md for scoring rules and reassessment triggers.

**Control.** The organisation evaluates its Indigenous data handling practices against this catalogue and the CARE and FAIR principles at least once every 12 months, and whenever a new dataset, recipient, agreement change or incident enters scope. An accountable officer attests to the self-assessment, records it in the tamper-evident audit log, and provides it to the affected community for independent review.

**Why.** Policies that are never measured drift away from practice. A strict weakest-link maturity score paired with community review shows where protection is real and where work remains, without pretending that self-assessment is certification.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation completes a documented self-assessment across all applicable domains at least once every 12 months, signed by the accountable officer with supporting evidence for every control above IDG-ML0. |
| IDG-ML2 | Each self-assessment is recorded in the audit chain, provided to the affected community for review with its review status tracked, and re-run after major agreement, dataset or incident triggers. |
| IDG-ML3 | Reassessment reminders are triggered automatically when intervals lapse, agreements change or a community queries or rejects a prior assessment, and remediation plans are tracked openly with the community. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; R1: For positive relationships; E2: For justice
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.; control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: attestation, report, audit_log, meeting_record
- BlakSmith evidence: The IDG package generates fillable YAML and CSV self-assessment templates from the live catalogue, validates completeness and fixed non-certification attestation wording, scores each domain by its weakest applicable control, and records the digest, scores and reported community review status in the tenant's hash-chained audit log while closing open reassessment reminders.; packages/idg/src/assessment.ts; packages/idg/src/assessment-cli.ts; docs/idg/self-assessment.md; packages/idg/src/assessment.test.ts; Gaps: Community review status is reported by the organisation rather than entered directly by the community. New datasets, new recipients, incidents and catalogue version bumps are not yet detected automatically as reassessment triggers by the governance worker.
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.4: partial. The Framework asks APS agencies to evaluate data governance practices using FAIR and CARE. IDG adds a defined maturity scale (IDG-ML0 to IDG-ML3), weakest-link scoring, accountable-officer attestation, audit-chain recording and community review.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-assurance: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. Provides structured evidence of governance practice to the community the data is about.
- Related: IDG-ASR-002, IDG-ASR-005, IDG-GOV-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-21): First provisional draft covering AFGID G4.4 and IDG self-assessment cadence.

### IDG-ASR-002 Continuous automated control evidence anchored to the audit chain

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

Automated evidence covers controls with runnable checks and reports manual controls explicitly rather than treating them as passed.

**Control.** Where technical controls protect Indigenous data, the organisation runs automated checks against its live or verification environment on a defined schedule, signs the resulting evidence bundle with an operator signing key, and anchors the bundle digest into the tenant's tamper-evident audit chain so gaps and regressions are visible over time.

**Why.** Point-in-time reviews miss configuration drift and code regressions. Signed, chain-linked evidence bundles tie automated test results to an exact commit, catalogue version and audit chain head without leaking underlying record content.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Automated checks exist for core technical controls and are run before releases, with results retained alongside the commit tested. |
| IDG-ML2 | Every mapped check runs in a repeatable pipeline that outputs a signed evidence bundle recording pass, fail, missing, manual and unchecked statuses, anchored to the audit chain. |
| IDG-ML3 | Evidence bundles are signed with a managed operator key, verified against a pinned public key in the governance interface, and surfaced to communities alongside any failed or missing checks. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: system_check, audit_log, report, configuration
- BlakSmith evidence: pnpm idg:evidence executes every unit test and verify script mapped across the catalogue, builds a canonical JSON bundle excluding raw check output, signs it with Ed25519, records the tenant's audit chain head in the bundle, and appends an idg.evidence.recorded event carrying the bundle SHA-256 digest to the same audit chain.; packages/idg/src/evidence.ts; packages/idg/src/evidence-cli.ts; packages/graph/src/audit-chain.ts; packages/idg/src/evidence.test.ts; Gaps: Evidence runs are executed manually against a seeded verification database rather than on an automatic production schedule. Without an operator signing key file, bundles use an ephemeral key and are marked unverified in the web interface. Communities do not yet have a direct portal view of evidence bundles.
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) CA-7(1): supports; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.PS-04: supports; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. Produces verifiable, signed evidence of technical control checks without claiming certification or endorsement.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-assurance: supports
- Related: IDG-ASR-001, IDG-TEC-010, IDG-TEC-011

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-21): First provisional draft for signed, chain-anchored automated control evidence.

### IDG-ASR-003 Community data inventory and FAIR metadata quality verification

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: public, internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation maintains a current inventory of all Indigenous data assets it holds, recording provenance, sensitivity classification, cultural protocols, Local Contexts labels, storage location, consent status, active agreements and end-of-use terms, and provides each community with an accessible inventory of data relating to it without exposing existence-hidden material to unauthorised people.

**Why.** A community cannot exercise authority over data it does not know exists. Maintaining a structured, protocol-aware inventory also measures FAIR metadata richness and provenance while upholding CARE authority and protection rules.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation maps every repository and dataset holding Indigenous data and can give each community a plain-language list of what is held about it on request. |
| IDG-ML2 | Inventories are generated from live system metadata with provenance, protocols, consent, agreements and outside-party access included, and are verified for completeness at least annually. |
| IDG-ML3 | Communities receive accessible, protocol-aware inventories on an agreed schedule or on demand, and metadata quality defects such as missing provenance, consent or review dates are measured and remediated continuously. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; C2: For improved governance and citizen engagement; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: contextual: Data that is contextual and disaggregated (available and accessible at individual, community and First Nations levels).; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: register, report, system_check, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: The graph package builds a per-custodian-group community data inventory and renders it as accessible WCAG 2.2 AA HTML showing each permitted record's sensitivity, cultural protocols, labels, residency, consent status, active agreements, end-of-use terms and outside-party recipients, while honouring existence hiding.; packages/graph/src/community-inventory.ts; packages/graph/src/community-inventory-html.ts; packages/graph/src/community-sharing-report.ts; packages/graph/src/community-inventory.test.ts; packages/graph/src/community-sharing-report.test.ts; Gaps: Community inventories are generated by operators or through authenticated tenant API routes rather than delivered through an independent community-directed portal (issue #236). Automated metadata completeness scoring across all FAIR fields is not yet built.
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.1: partial. The Framework asks APS agencies to map Indigenous data assets and share that mapping in an accessible format. IDG adds protocol-aware filtering, consent and agreement tracking, and ongoing metadata verification.; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G3.5(a): supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) F2: supports. Verifies that records carry rich governance and descriptive metadata while honouring cultural protocol restrictions.; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1: supports; FAIR Guiding Principles for scientific data management and stewardship (Wilkinson et al. 2016, Scientific Data 3, 160018) R1.2: supports. Checks that provenance, consent and agreement lineage remain attached to each data asset.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports
- Related: IDG-PRC-014, IDG-PRC-016, IDG-TEC-002, IDG-TEC-003

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-21): First provisional draft covering AFGID G3.1 and FAIR metadata inventory checks.

### IDG-ASR-004 Periodic verification of data transfer logs and backup restoration drills

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The organisation verifies data transfer and export logs at least monthly against active community agreements, and tests restoration from backups on a regular schedule to confirm both recovery readiness and that prior cryptographic erasures, consent revocations and purges are reapplied without restoring destroyed Indigenous data.

**Why.** Unreviewed export logs fail to catch unauthorised transfers, and untested backup restores risk either losing community data or silently resurrecting records a community ordered destroyed.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Transfer and export logs are sampled and checked against active agreements at least quarterly, and a written backup restoration procedure includes reapplying erasures and purges. |
| IDG-ML2 | Transfer logs are partially verified at least monthly with anomalies investigated and recorded, and backup restoration is tested at least annually in a non-production environment including erasure and purge replay. |
| IDG-ML3 | Automated checks reconcile every export and download against active sharing agreements and alert on exceptions, and scheduled restore drills prove destroyed keys and purged records remain unreadable after recovery, with drill results reported to affected communities. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: audit_log, report, procedure, system_check
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1294: partial. The ISM requires data transfer logs to be partially verified at least monthly. IDG adds reconciliation against active community sharing agreements and reporting exceptions to custodians.; Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1515: partial. The ISM requires testing restoration from backups in disaster recovery exercises. IDG adds verifying that cryptographic erasures and community-ordered purges stay effective after restore.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-11: supports; Essential Eight Maturity Model (November 2023) Regular backups: supports
- Related: IDG-TEC-007, IDG-TEC-014, IDG-TEC-016, IDG-PRC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-21): First provisional draft closing ISM-1294 and ISM-1515 verification gaps.

### IDG-ASR-005 Independent partnership and governance health check

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: both. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** At an interval agreed with the communities whose data it holds, the organisation conducts an impartial partnership and governance health check carried out by an independent reviewer acceptable to the communities, evaluating whether agreements, cultural protocols, benefit commitments and governance bodies work in practice. Findings and remediation actions are shared transparently with the communities.

**Why.** Internal self-assessments reflect the organisation's own view. Impartial external review gives communities an independent check on whether agreed governance practices and relationships are honoured over time.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation and community agree terms for periodic review of their data governance relationship and document any concerns raised. |
| IDG-ML2 | An impartial reviewer acceptable to the community conducts a partnership health check on an agreed cycle covering agreements, protocols and benefit delivery, and delivers findings to both parties. |
| IDG-ML3 | Independent health checks include Indigenous-led assessment, track remediation of prior findings to closure, and feed directly into the governing body's oversight under IDG-GOV-004. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; E2: For justice; C3: For equitable outcomes
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.; control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: report, meeting_record, interview, agreement
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G1.6: partial. The Framework asks APS agencies to conduct regular partnership health checks with external, impartial monitoring. IDG extends this to any organisation holding Indigenous data, requires community acceptance of the reviewer and shares results directly with the community.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) oversight-assurance: supports; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) CA-7(1): partial. Covers independent assessment chosen by the organisation. IDG requires community acceptance of the reviewer and sharing findings with the community.
- Related: IDG-ASR-001, IDG-GOV-004, IDG-GOV-005, IDG-PRC-008

Change log:

- v1 (2026-11-21): First provisional draft covering AFGID G1.6 partnership health checks.

## CON: Consuming entity

### IDG-CON-001 A named accountable officer

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The receiving organisation names a senior person who is accountable for how it handles the data, who signs the agreement and any attestations, and who the community can contact directly. Responsibility cannot be passed to a contractor or a project team.

**Why.** When something goes wrong, the community needs one person who is answerable and has the authority to act.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | An accountable officer is named in the agreement, with contact details the community holds. |
| IDG-ML2 | The accountable officer signs the agreement and every attestation, and a replacement is named before they leave. |
| IDG-ML3 | The accountable officer reports to the community at agreed intervals on how the data is being used. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; A3: Governance of data
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: agreement, attestation, register
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 7: partial. Accountability inside the entity. IDG adds a named contact the community can reach.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) GV.RR-01: partial. Leadership accountability. IDG adds signing the agreement and attestations.; ISO/IEC 38505-1: Governance of data, application of ISO/IEC 38500 to the governance of data (ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017, first edition (withdrawn 20 August 2026)) governing-body-accountability: supports. Both place accountability for the use of data with senior people. IDG-CON-001 names one accountable officer for a specific agreement, who the community can contact directly.
- Related: IDG-CON-002

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-04): Mapped to ISO/IEC 38505-1:2017 (governance of data).

### IDG-CON-002 Only approved users

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Only people named on an approved users list may access the data. The community or its delegate approves each person before access, and the list is kept current, with people removed as soon as they no longer need access.

**Why.** A dataset shared with an organisation is often passed around inside it. A named list keeps access to the people the community agreed to.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | A list of people with access is kept and given to the community. |
| IDG-ML2 | Each person is approved before access, and the list is reviewed at least every six months. |
| IDG-ML3 | Access is technically limited to the approved list, and changes are notified to the community. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.
- Evidence types: register, configuration, audit_log
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0405: partial. Validation by the organisation. IDG requires approval by the community.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-2: partial. Account approval by the organisation. IDG requires approval by the community.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 75: partial. Need-to-know only. IDG requires a named list approved by the community.
- Related: IDG-CON-001, IDG-PPL-007

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-003 A secure environment matched to the data

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

For protected and restricted data, a dedicated environment such as a secure research platform is expected.

**Control.** The data is held and used only in an environment with security that matches its sensitivity: access control, encryption, logging and backups the community has agreed to. It is not copied to personal devices, personal email or unapproved cloud services.

**Why.** Data that leaves a secure environment, even briefly, is outside every other control in the agreement.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The environment where the data will be held is described in the agreement. |
| IDG-ML2 | The environment has access control, encryption at rest, logging and backups, with no personal device or unapproved cloud use, confirmed before data is released. |
| IDG-ML3 | The environment has been independently assessed, and the data cannot be copied out of it without approval. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: configuration, attestation, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1080: supports; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-01: supports; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) PR.DS-02: supports
- Related: IDG-TEC-004, IDG-TEC-005

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-004 Use only for the agreed purpose

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The data is used only for the purpose in the agreement. Any other use, including a new research question, needs a new approval from the community first.

**Why.** Purpose is the line the community drew when it agreed to share.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Everyone with access knows the agreed purpose and has agreed in writing to keep to it. |
| IDG-ML2 | New uses are put to the community for approval before work starts, and the decision is recorded. |
| IDG-ML3 | Use of the data is logged against the agreed purpose, and the log is available to the community. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; relevant: Data that is relevant and empowers sustainable self-determination and effective self-governance.
- Evidence types: agreement, attestation, register
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 6: partial. APP 6 allows some uses beyond the primary purpose without consent.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PT-3: partial. Purposes set by the organisation, not agreed with the community.
- Related: IDG-PRC-003, IDG-PRC-004

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-005 No onward sharing

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The receiving organisation does not share the data, or anything derived from it, with anyone outside the approved users, unless the agreement allows it and the community approves the specific recipient. Any approved onward recipient is bound by the same terms.

**Why.** Each onward share takes the data further from the community's sight.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Staff and contractors have agreed in writing not to share the data onward. |
| IDG-ML2 | Any onward share has the community's written approval and is recorded. |
| IDG-ML3 | Technical controls prevent the data being sent outside the approved environment. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: agreement, attestation, configuration
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) PS-6: partial. Access agreements signed by users. IDG adds community approval for each onward recipient.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AC-21: supports; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 6: supports
- Related: IDG-PRC-011

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-006 No re-identification and no unapproved linkage

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The receiving organisation does not try to identify any person, family or community from the data, and does not link it with other data unless the community approved that linkage. If someone is identified by accident, the organisation stops, does not use or share the result, and tells the community.

**Why.** Small populations are easy to identify even without names, and linkage multiplies the risk.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Everyone with access has agreed in writing not to re-identify or link the data. |
| IDG-ML2 | Approved linkages are recorded with the community's approval, and accidental identification is reported. |
| IDG-ML3 | Outputs are checked for re-identification risk before they leave the environment. |

- CARE: E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; E2: For justice
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: agreement, attestation, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) SI-19: supports; Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.12: supports. Bars a recipient from identifying a family or community as well as a person, which protects group privacy for data already shared.
- Related: IDG-PRC-012

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-CON-007 No AI training or processing without agreement

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The data is not used to train, tune or prompt any AI model, and is not entered into any AI tool or service, unless the agreement allows that specific use.

**Why.** Once data is inside a model or an AI service it cannot be recalled, and it may resurface anywhere.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Everyone with access has agreed in writing not to use the data with AI tools unless the agreement allows it. |
| IDG-ML2 | AI tools are blocked or restricted in the environment where the data is held. |
| IDG-ML3 | Any permitted AI use is limited to tools and locations the community approved, and is logged. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E3: For future use
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: policy, configuration, attestation
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-2074: partial. A general AI usage policy. IDG bans AI use of the data unless the agreement allows it.
- Related: IDG-TEC-017

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-008 Tell the community about any breach

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** If the data is lost, accessed without authority, disclosed or used outside the agreement, the receiving organisation tells the community and the data custodian as soon as practicable and within the time in the agreement, and works with them on the response. Telling a regulator does not replace telling the community.

**Why.** The community can only protect itself from harm it knows about.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation's incident procedure includes notifying the community and the custodian. |
| IDG-ML2 | Notification times are set in the agreement and tested in an exercise. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community is involved in investigating and reviewing every incident involving its data. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: procedure, report, agreement
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1880: partial. Reporting to customers. IDG requires telling the community and the custodian.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) NDB: partial. Covers serious harm to individuals only.; NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (CSF 2.0 (NIST CSWP 29)) RS.CO-02: partial. Stakeholders are chosen by the organisation.
- Related: IDG-PRC-009

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-009 Destroy or return the data at the end, and attest to it

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** When the agreement ends, or the community asks, the receiving organisation destroys or returns the data as agreed, including copies, backups and derived data, and the accountable officer signs an attestation saying what was destroyed or returned, how and when.

**Why.** Without an attestation, the community has no assurance its data is really gone.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The organisation knows where every copy of the data is held. |
| IDG-ML2 | At the end, every copy, backup and derived file is destroyed or returned and the accountable officer signs an attestation. |
| IDG-ML3 | Destruction is independently verified or evidenced by system records, and the attestation is given to the community. |

- CARE: A1: Recognizing rights and interests; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: control: Exercise control of the data ecosystem including creation, development, stewardship, analysis, dissemination and infrastructure.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: attestation, register, procedure
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) MP-6(1): partial. Tracking media sanitisation. IDG adds backups, derived data and an attestation to the community.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 73: partial. Secure disposal. IDG adds an attestation to the community.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme (APP guidelines chapters as versioned on each entry, and the NDB scheme page) APP 11: partial. Destroy or de-identify when no longer needed. IDG adds return or destruction on request.
- Related: IDG-PRC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-010 Community review before publication

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Before publishing or presenting anything that uses the data, the receiving organisation gives the community the time agreed to review it, and acts on the community's concerns as the agreement sets out, including any right to withhold culturally sensitive material.

**Why.** Publication is permanent. The community should see how it is represented before everyone else does.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | The agreement says which outputs the community reviews and how long it has. |
| IDG-ML2 | Every output is sent for review before release, and the community's response is recorded. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community is involved in interpreting the findings, not only reviewing them. |

- CARE: A3: Governance of data; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit; R3: For Indigenous languages and worldviews
- Maiam nayri Wingara: relevant: Data that is relevant and empowers sustainable self-determination and effective self-governance.; protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: agreement, meeting_record, register
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (Version 1.0) G4.8(b): supports. Community review before publication covers the interpretation and dissemination phases only.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: no equivalent. No control gives a community review of publications before release.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme: no equivalent. No principle gives a community review of publications before release.
- Related: IDG-CON-011

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-03): Mapped to the Framework for Governance of Indigenous Data (NIAA 2024).

### IDG-CON-011 Benefit sharing and attribution

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The receiving organisation delivers the benefits to the community set out in the agreement, credits the community as the community asks, and shares findings back in a form the community can use.

**Why.** Data about a community should benefit that community, not only the people who use it.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Benefits and attribution are written into the agreement. |
| IDG-ML2 | Benefits delivered and findings shared are recorded and reported to the community. |
| IDG-ML3 | The community helps decide what benefit means for each project, and reviews whether it was delivered. |

- CARE: C1: For inclusive development and innovation; C3: For equitable outcomes; R2: For expanding capability and capacity
- Maiam nayri Wingara: relevant: Data that is relevant and empowers sustainable self-determination and effective self-governance.
- Evidence types: agreement, report, register
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: no equivalent. No control addresses benefit to the people the data is about.; Privacy Act 1988: Australian Privacy Principles and the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme: no equivalent. No principle addresses benefit sharing.
- Related: IDG-CON-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-012 Recipient staff are trained before data is released

Status: provisional. Version 1. Audience: consumer. Applies to: internal, sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** Before the data is released, the receiving organisation shows that everyone on its approved users list has completed the cultural competency and data sovereignty training in IDG-PPL-003, and has been briefed on the specific conditions in this agreement.

**Why.** Recipients often have the least context about the community whose data they hold.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Approved users complete training before access. |
| IDG-ML2 | Training records are kept and provided to the community on request, and refreshed at least every 12 months. |
| IDG-ML3 | Training is designed or delivered with the community or an Indigenous-led provider. |

- CARE: R1: For positive relationships; E1: For minimizing harm and maximizing benefit
- Maiam nayri Wingara: protective: Data that is protective and respects our individual and collective interests.
- Evidence types: training_record, attestation
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-0252: partial. Cyber security awareness only, not cultural competency.; Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) (PSPF Release 2026) 24: partial. Security awareness only, not cultural competency.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AT-2: partial. Security and privacy literacy only.
- Related: IDG-PPL-003, IDG-CON-002

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.

### IDG-CON-013 Access records available to the community

Status: provisional. Version 2. Audience: consumer. Applies to: sensitive, protected, restricted.

**Control.** The receiving organisation keeps a record of who accessed the data and when, and gives it to the community or the data custodian on request.

**Why.** The community's ability to see how its data is used should not stop at the organisation that first held it.

| Maturity | Descriptor |
| --- | --- |
| IDG-ML0 | Not in place, or not at ML1. |
| IDG-ML1 | Access to the data is logged. |
| IDG-ML2 | Access logs are kept for the life of the agreement and provided on request. |
| IDG-ML3 | Access logs are reported to the community at agreed intervals without being asked. |

- CARE: A2: Data for governance; R1: For positive relationships
- Maiam nayri Wingara: accountable: Data structures that are accountable to Indigenous peoples and First Nations.
- Evidence types: audit_log, report
- BlakSmith evidence: manual
- Crosswalks: Information Security Manual (ISM) (September 2026 (OSCAL release v2026.09.4)) ISM-1988: partial. Retention for 12 months. IDG requires sharing with the community on request.; NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (Rev. 5, release 5.2.0) AU-11: partial. Retention only. IDG requires sharing with the community on request.; TRUST Principles for digital repositories (Lin et al. 2020, Scientific Data 7, 144) transparency: supports. The receiving organisation gives the community its access record. This goes to the community, not the public.
- Related: IDG-PPL-010, IDG-TEC-010

Change log:

- v1 (2026-10-31): First provisional draft.
- v2 (2026-11-01): Mapped to the FAIR and TRUST principles.
